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Abstract
A variety of economic agents rely on information generated by the consumers
when making their decisions. Not only consumers’ rely on other consumers’ ex-
periences when making their buying decisions, but also some governmental agen-
cies rely on customers’ complaints to make inferences about the functioning of
some markets. Little is known, however, about how this information interacts
with the firms’ investing and pricing decisions. A common denominator of the
various types of information generated by the consumers is that its content de-
pends on consumers’ incentives to transmit information, which are not always
obvious and may vary across markets and time. This thesis studies the role of
the information generated by the consumers in two different contexts. The first
chapter studies whether customers’ complaints about the quality provided by a
regulated monopolist are informative about the firm’s investment decisions. The
second chapter considers the pricing decision of a monopoly firm when the con-
sumers’ buying decision is based on the reviews completed by previous consumers.
The main contributions are twofold. First, by endogenising consumers deci-
sion to lodge a complaint or complete a review, I am able to derive conclusions
about the informational content of consumers behaviour and about its strategic
interaction with the firms decisions. Second, the thesis makes a methodologi-
cal contribution because it proposes a novel way of dealing with the free riding
problem that lies at the very root of the generation of information by consumers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A variety of economic agents rely on information generated by the consumers
when making their decisions. For instance, consumers’ rely on other consumers’
experiences when making their buying decisions,1 and some governmental agen-
cies rely on customers’ complaints to make inferences about the quality of a
service.2 However, little is known about how this information interacts with the
firms’ investing and pricing decisions. A common denominator of the various
types of information generated by the consumers is that its content depends on
consumers’ incentives to transmit information, which are not always obvious and
may vary across markets and along time. As a result, the effect of customers’
complaints and reviews on the firms’ behaviour is not obvious, as neither is their
impact on aggregate welfare.
This thesis explores the relationship between the information generated by
the consumers and the behaviour of a monopoly firm. The first chapter studies
the potential of customer complaints as a regulatory tool to induce higher invest-
1In fact, empirical evidence suggest that consumers’ reviews are an important determinant
of the firms’ revenues -see Luca (2011), Doyle and Waterson (2012), and Chevalier and Mayzlin
(2006), among others.
2According to the European Union’s report “Monitoring Consumer Markets in the Euro-
pean Union” (2011), the complaints measurement is considered “a key metric to evaluate the
functioning of a market” (page 12).
1
ment in quality. The second chapter considers a monopolist’s pricing strategy
when consumers’ information about the quality of an experience good is the one
contained in the reviews completed by previous buyers. In both cases, a con-
sumer’s decision to transmit information is endogenous. As a result, they derive
conclusions about the informational content of consumers’ behaviour and about
its strategic interaction with the firm’s decisions. A common message of the two
chapters is that a note of care should be taken when considering consumers’ com-
plaints and reviews. The results suggest that the widespread belief that the mere
existence of consumer-generated information increases consumers’ welfare may be
true but it needs further qualifications.
Chapter 2, studies whether customers’ complaints are informative about the
investment decision of a monopoly firm in contexts in which quality is not verifi-
able and consumers cannot (fully) appropriate the benefits of their complaints. It
proposes a psychological game in which a firm decides whether to make a costly
investment that increases quality in a first order stochastic dominance sense, and
the consumers decide whether to complain or not. The consumers do not observe
the firm’s investment. Their complaining decision is driven by the difference be-
tween the level of quality they were expecting to receive and the one they actually
received.3 It is shown that the presence of this (rational) reference point may in-
duce a positive correlation between the observed proportion of complaints and
the firm’s investment.
Chapter 3 studies a dynamic game in which a long-lived monopoly faces a
sequence of short-lived consumers. Neither the firm nor the consumers have ex-
ante information about the value of an experience good, but they learn from
the reviews completed by previous buyers. If he buys, the consumer observes a
3Empirical evidence suggests that this is indeed the case. See Forbes (2008), for example.
2
quality realisation and may complete a review. The consumers complete reviews
according to a social rule that maximises the present value of current and future
consumers utility. The paper shows that the reviews induce a mean preserving
spread on the posterior beliefs about the value of the good which, combined with
the convexity of the utility and the profit functions, implies the reviews are valu-
able for both the consumers and the firm. Hence, both parties are willing to face
some cost in order to increase the information available in the market. From the
firm’s perspective, this cost takes the form of a discount in the price offered to
current consumers. As this discount has the additional effect of compensating
consumers for the cost of completing reviews, it induces a reviewing rule that
is more favourable to the firm (in the sense that it increases the firms expected
profits). It is further shown that a necessary condition for the existence of reviews
is that the firm cannot fully appropriate the surplus generated by this increased
information.
The thesis also makes a methodological contribution because it proposes a
novel way of dealing with the well-known free riding problem that lies at the very
root of the generation of information by consumers. A common feature of the
two types of consumers’ generated information I study is the presence of (at least
some level of) free riding incentives. When the consumer makes a complaint or
when he completes a review he is essentially taking a costly action, the benefits of
which he cannot (fully) appropriate.4 Hence, the complaining and the reviewing
decisions have some similarities with an agent’s decision to participate in a large
election. Therefore, to tackle this difficulty, I borrow from the voting literature
and I assume that consumers are group-utilitarians, i.e., they receive a positive
payoff for acting according to a strategy that maximises their group’s aggregate
4For example, empirical studies on eBay show that most of the times the customer is not
likely to buy again from the same seller, implying that he does not receive a direct benefit from
completing a review. Yet, Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) report that 52.1% of the buyers on
eBay actually provide voluntary feedback about their sellers.
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utility.
The rest of this Introduction is organised as follows. The next section briefly
summarises the models of chapters 2 and 3 and presents their main results. Sec-
tion 1.2 discusses the role of the utilitarian assumption as a solution to the free
riding problem. Finally, Section 1.3 revises the existing literature and discusses
the contributions of the models proposed in this thesis.
1.1 Modelling Complaints and Reviews
Chapter 2 proposes a theoretical model to analyse the informativeness of cus-
tomers’ complaints when the benefits of those complaints can not be fully ap-
propriated. A regulated monopoly decides whether to make a costly investment
that increases quality. Neither the consumer nor the regulator observe the firm’s
investment, but consumers observe a realisation of quality that is related to in-
vestment in a first order stochastic dominance sense. After observing quality,
consumers decide whether to complain or not. If a high proportion of consumers
complain, the regulator punishes the firm.
The model in this chapter is a psychological game between a monopoly firm
and the consumers. After observing a quality realisation, the consumers decide
whether to complain by comparing the quality they received with the one they
were expecting. Consumers’ reference point is determined by their rational ex-
pectations.5 In this way, the model captures the idea that “disappointment” and
“poor performance” are endogenously defined and depend on the context. The
presence of a reference point in consumers’ complaining decisions implies that the
5Forbes (2008) assumes that consumers form an unbiased expectation of the quality they
will receive. With rational expectations, her empirical results imply that an increase in qual-
ity decreases the (expected) proportion of complaints only when the higher quality was not
anticipated by consumers. The same is true in the model of this paper.
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payoff functions of both the consumers and the firm depend not only on what
they do but also on what consumers were expecting from the firm, which reflects
the psychological aspect of the game.6
The main result is that complaints are not always informative about the firm’s
investment behaviour. Indeed, a firm might be punished despite of investment
levels being high if consumers expected high quality or, on the contrary, not being
punished when investing is low if consumers expected low quality. Furthermore,
this lack of informativeness can be worsened by a repeated interaction between
the firm and the consumers.
The final chapter of this thesis studies a firm’s pricing strategy when buyers
can complete reviews about the value of the product. It considers a situation in
which a long lived monopoly faces a sequence of short lived consumers whose only
information about the value of the product is the one contained in the reviews
completed by previous buyers. After the firm choses a product’s price, the con-
sumers decide whether to buy or not. If they buy, they may complete a review.
Before buying, neither the consumers nor the firm have private information about
the good’s value, so the price and the previous consumers’ buying decisions are
not informative. However, after buying consumers observe a quality realisation
that is correlated with the actual value of the product, and thus they are bet-
ter informed than the firm and the future consumers. Consumers may decide to
transmit this information by completing reviews.
Consumers complete reviews according to a social rule that maximises the
present value of current and future consumers’ utility. It is shown that customers’
reviews induce a mean preserving spread on the beliefs about the value of the
6See, for example, Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989) and Battigalli and Dufwen-
berg (2009).
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good. Combined with the convexity of the utility and the profit functions, the
increased variability of the posterior beliefs results in the information contained
in the reviews being valuable for both, the consumers and the firm. Hence, both
parties are willing to face some cost in order to increase the information avail-
able in the market. From the firm’s perspective, this cost takes the form of a
“discount” in the price offered to current consumers. By reducing the current
price, the firm increases current (expected) demand which in turn increases the
probability with which the current consumer completes reviews. As this discount
has the additional effect of compensating consumers for the cost of completing
reviews, it also induces a reviewing rule that is more favourable to the firm (in
the sense that it increases the expected future profits in the scenario with reviews).
1.2 Free Riding and the Group-Utilitarian As-
sumption
The two papers that form this thesis deal with the free riding problem by
assuming that consumers are group utilitarians. The notion of utilitarian agents
has been proposed by Harsanyi to explain the so-called “paradox of no voting”:
if voting is costly then, since the likelihood of a vote being pivotal is very small,
standard game-theoretic models predict low levels of turn out (Downs 1957).
Harsanyi’s notion of group utilitarians was later formalised by Feddersen and
Sandroni (2006b). This assumption is useful in the contexts I study because it
constitutes a plausible explanation for consumers’ behaviour in settings in which
tangible benefits accrue only if aggregate participation is high, and no one can be
excluded from the benefits of group success. The application of the group utili-
tarian assumption to models of complaints and reviews is one of the contributions
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of this thesis and it constitutes, to the best of my knowledge, the first application
of this idea outside the area of Political Economy. Therefore, it is worth looking
deeply into its meaning and formal implications. The next subsection defines and
explains this assumption within the voting model developed by Feddersen and
Sandroni (2006a, 2006b) and Coate and Conlin (2004). Then, I briefly discuss
how the utilitarian assumption is used in the models of complaints and reviews
proposed in this thesis.
The Utilitarian Assumption
The utilitarian assumption has been proposed as a solution to the free rid-
ing problem in the voting context. The starting point is the work by Harsanyi
(1977, 1980, 1992). Harsanyi argues that voting may usefully be understood as
individuals acting according to the dictates of rule-utilitarianism, and proposes
a game theoretic model in which people receives a payoff for acting “ethically”.
He illustrates his argument with a situation in which a fixed number of votes is
needed to pass a policy that would raise aggregate utility. Each citizen faces the
same cost of voting and chooses a probability of voting that, if adopted by all,
would maximise aggregate utility. The key insight is that the optimal probability
is between zero and one. Not everybody should stay at home, because that would
mean the policy would not pass. But not everybody should vote because that
would result in a surfeit of votes, imposing unnecessary costs on society. In this
way, the logic of rule-utilitarianism yields an elegant theory of turnout. Harsanyi
assumes that everyone does their duty, but rejects the implicit assumption that
doing one’s duty always involves voting.
Harsanyi’s insight has been formalised by Feddersen and Sandroni (2006a,
2006b).7 They model a large election with two candidates, in which voting costs
7Feddersen and Sandroni (2006a) develops the conceptual and operational foundations for
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vary within the population and a single vote is never pivotal. Agents have pref-
erences over the candidates and the cost of the election. There are two types of
agents: those who prefer candidate 1 and those who prefer candidate 2. Fixing
the probability of winning for each candidate, all agents prefer to minimise the
cost of the election. Given a preference type, a rule defines a cut-off point such
that agents with voting costs below this threshold should vote for their favoured
candidate and those with voting costs above the threshold should abstain. They
assume that some agents, called ethicals, receive a payoff for acting according to
the rule. A solution concept called “consistency” links agents’ preferences with
actual behaviour in a way analogous to a Nash Equilibrium. The optimal voting
rule constitutes a Nash Equilibrium of a game in which the supporters of the two
parties aim to maximise the probability that their preferred candidate wins the
election, net of the social cost of voting. The consistency requirement adds to
the equilibrium concept the participation constraint that each agent’s payoff from
ethical behaviour exceeds his voting cost.8 In this way, Feddersen and Sandroni’s
(2006b) model shows that costly voting and strategic considerations may coexist
in a formal model.9
Coate and Conlin (2004) apply a version of the utilitarian model to a refer-
endum. The key difference between their model and Feddersen and Sandroni’s
(2006b) is that in the former individuals follow the voting rule that maximises the
the ethical voting model used in Feddersen and Sandroni (2006b) and Coate and Conlin (2004).
8Feddersen and Sandroni (2006a) show that ethical voting models share a common math-
ematical structure with elite driven turnout models. However, the micro foundations for both
types of models differ significantly. While in the ethical voting model each agent acts inde-
pendently on the basis of their own assessment of what constitutes ethical action, in the elite
driven models agents are provided direct incentives by the leader’s instructions. In the models
of complaints and reviews, the second interpretation could mean, for example, that consumers
follow the directions of some sort of Consumers’ Association.
9Their model predicts high levels of turn out and comparative statics that are consistent
with strategic behaviour. It further delivers testable implications and predicts variations in
expected turnout and margin of victory as a function of various parameters of the model, like
the costs to vote, the level of disagreement within the electorate, and the importance of the
election, for example.
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payoffs of those on their side of the issue, while in the latter they follow the rule
that (they believe) maximises aggregate utility.10 11 They structurally estimate a
parameterised version of their group utilitarian model using data on Texas liquor
referenda. The results of the empirical estimations are broadly consistent with
the comparative static predictions of the model.
Apart from the applications to voting and to the complain and reviews ex-
amples of this thesis, Harsanyi’s (1980) type arguments have been proposed as a
possible explanation to household’s response to conservation appeals during the
California’s energy crisis in 2000 and 2001. Reiss and White (2008) find empirical
evidence that consumers do respond to voluntary appeals provided the costs of
a collective action failure are tangible and that the public is well aware of it.
Even though their work is purely empirical, the utilitarian-type argument seems
a plausible explanation for those results.12
Group-Utilitarians, Complaints and Reviews
In the models of Chapters 2 and 3 I assume that consumers are group-
utilitarians in the sense of Coate and Conlin (2004).13 In both models, the
“group” is broadly defined as “the consumers”. In Chapter 2 consumers are long
lived players and so “the consumers” is the group formed by the firm’s customers.
In Chapter 3 consumers are short lived and thus the firm’s potential customers
10Therefore, Coate and Conlin (2004) define agents in their model as “group utilitarians”.
11Another difference between the two models is that Coate and Conlin (2004) allow the two
groups to differ in the intensity of their preferences for their preferred alternative.
12In this case, each household faces private cost of reducing consumption, a virtually zero
possibility of bringing about any tangible benefit with respect to the crisis through individual
effort, and a considerable incentive to free-ride on whatever efforts are made by others.
13As a simplifying assumption, it is assumed in both chapters that all the consumers receive
a positive payoff for acting “ethically” and so all of them could potentially lodge a complaint
or complete a review. This is a minor difference with the models in Feddersen and Sandroni
(2006a, 2006b), that assume that only a fraction of the population receives such a payoff.
Introducing this possibility in my models would not modify the results in any significative way.
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change every period; the “group” in this case is defined as all the consumers,
current and future.14
In both chapters consumers are ex-ante homogeneous but ex-post heteroge-
neous in some dimension. In the model of Chapter 2, heterogeneity is introduced
by assuming that the costs of lodging a complaint vary across agents. Therefore,
a complaining rule consists in a cut off cost of complaining below which a con-
sumer lodges a complain. This threshold maximises consumers’ aggregate utility
given the regulatory rule, consumers’ prior expectations and the quality they re-
ceived. In the chapter about reviews, the cost of completing a review is assumed
to be the constant across consumers, but the quality observed by consumers if
they buy may vary. In this case, the rule specifies which review the consumer
should complete (if any) after every possible quality realisation, given the firm’s
strategy.15
The assumption of group utilitarian consumers has different formal implica-
tions for the complaints and the reviews models, even though in both cases it
is assumed that consumers aim to maximise the present value of consumers’ ex-
pected utility. In the first case, the specific regulatory rule I am studying implies
that current complaints are a sunk cost when the firm decides its future invest-
ment level. As a result, consumers only complain to punish the firm’s current
“poor performance” -i.e., they behave as if they were myopic. Together with the
utilitarian assumption, myopic behaviour results in a game that is strategically
equivalent to a game between a long lived firm and a sequence of short lived
consumers. In the chapter about reviews, since consumers’ aim to maximise the
14The assumption of short lived consumers is a way of modelling the fact that consumers
can not learn the value of the product from their own experience.
15Introducing heterogeneity in the costs of completing a review would not affect the results
significantly. It would imply a two-dimensions rule, with one dimension related to the observed
quality and another one consisting in a cutoff cost below which a consumer that observed a
certain quality realisation completes a review.
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present value of their group’s utility, the game is strategically equivalent to a
game between two long lived players.
1.3 Related Literature
This thesis relates to several strands of literature. The first strand emanates
from the large literature that studies how economic agents learn from the actions
of others. This includes models of worth-of-mouth communication16 and models
of herding and cascades.17 Within the first group, the transmission of information
is generally modelled by assuming that in every period new consumers meet (or
sample) an exogenous proportion of old consumers, who tell them their experience
with the product.18 In the herding models, on the other hand, the transmission
of information is modelled as an externality: an agent’s payoff depends on his
own decision and the state of nature, but not on the actions of others. Agents
take account of others’ actions only because of the information revealed by them.
Most of this literature aims to study the long run outcome of different variations
of those processes of information transmission. What differentiates the approach
in this thesis from all those papers is that I consider situations in which the
agents explicitly decide whether to transmit information and which information
to transmit. By making those decisions endogenous, I can study the other players’
best response to the information generated by the consumers and, hence, I can
get a more complete approach to the market effects of the consumers’ generated
16Like the ones in Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), Banerjee and Fundenberg (2004), and Ahn
and Souminen (2005), for example.
17Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and Smith and Sorensen
(2000), Bose, Orosel, Ottaviani, and Vesterlund (2006), Bose, Orosel, Ottaviani, and Vesterlund
(2008), among others.
18For example, Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) study the way in which worth-of-mouth aggre-
gates information of individual agents. By assuming that each player hears from the current
experience of a random sample of N other players (where N is an exogenous parameter), they
show that the structure of the worth-of-mouth process affects the tendency of a population to
display conformity or diversity.
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information.
Of the many applications within the herding literature, Bose, Orosel, Otta-
viani, and Vesterlund (2006) seems to be the closest one to the model presented
in Chapter 3. This paper studies the pricing strategy of a monopoly firm when
consumers obtain information about the value of the good from the buying de-
cision of others. The main difference between that model and the one I present
below is that in my case the transmission of information is not an externality but
the consumers make an explicit decision about how much and which information
to transmit.
Chapter 2 of this thesis also contributes to the extensive literature on quality
provision by a monopoly firm. Starting by the seminal papers of Spence (1975)
and Shesinski (1982), the literature suggests that an unregulated monopoly will
over or under supply quality according to whether the marginal consumer values
additional quality more or less highly than do the infra-marginal consumers on
average.19 It has further been shown that regulation of service prices can com-
pound, ameliorate or otherwise complicate the already existing market failure
(see for example, Spence (1975), Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Besanko, Donnen-
feld, and White (1987); Sappington (2005) surveys the literature).20 The main
conclusion of much of the existing literature is that when quality is not verifi-
able the regulator needs to have a great deal of information before even know
19The difference depends on whether quantity and quality are seen as substitutes or as
complements by consumers. In the former case, consumers willingness to pay a higher price for
an increase in quality decreases with the quantity that he buys (i.e., the demand curve becomes
less elastic as quality increases), while in the latter the elasticity of the demand increases with
quality. Thus, the monopoly is more likely to undersupply quality if quality and quantity are
substitutes, and to oversupply it if they are complements.
20Price ceilings that are independent of the firm’s realised costs limits its incentives to sup-
ply quality, because they prevent the firm from capturing any of the incremental consumer’s
surpluses that would result from the higher service quality. However, as noted by Laffont and
Tirole (1993), even under pure cost-of-service regulation, the regulated firm does not gain from
providing costly services either, so a low perceived cost of supplying quality does not imply a
high incentive to provide quality.
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in which direction he should intervene. By studying the informational content
of complaints, this paper considers whether the “police power” could be moved
from the regulatory agency to the consumers.
This chapter is also related to the literature on reference dependent utility21
and with some models in marketing research on customers satisfaction.22 In both
cases, it is suggested that consumers utility depends not only on the actual prod-
uct quality that was received but also on whether that quality was above or below
some reference level. This paper adds to the first branch of literature because, in
spite of being widely accepted, the effect of that reference point on consumers’
complaining decision and on the firm’s incentives to invest have not been studied
yet. It differs from the second branch in that they do not require consumers’
expectations to be rational and, as a result, they are not able to make clear pre-
dictions about the firm’s strategic response to consumers’ complaints.
Chapter 3 is also related with several branches of literature. Economic and
management literature has shown an increasing interest on different aspects of
users’ reviews and online behaviour. Existing research focuses mainly on the
relationship between customers’ reviews and the firm’s revenues or sales. For
example, Luca (2011) uses data from Yelp.com to study the impact of customers’
reviews on restaurant revenues; he shows that higher ranking implies higher rev-
enues. Similarly, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) shows that the differences between
customers’ reviews posted on Barnes and Noble and those posted on Amazon are
positively related to the differences in book sales on the two websites. The model
proposed in Chapter 3 not only explains those empirical findings, but it also de-
livers implications in terms of the firm’s pricing behaviour that results from the
21Kahneman and Tversky (2001), Koszegi and Rabin (2006), among others.
22See for example, Singh (1988), Zithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman (1996), Boulding, Kalra,
Staelin, and Zeithaml (1993), Oliver (1977), Oliver (1980).
13
existence of information transmission through the reviews.
Finally, the model in Chapter 3 is related to the literature on public tests. See,
for example, Gill and Sgroi (2008, 2012), Lerner and Tirole (2006). Similar to
this literature, the reviewing model in chapter 3 studies whether the firm would
choose to test its product publicly. The reviewing model I study differs from the
above mentioned ones in that the “toughness” of the test chosen by the firm in
the existing literature but the firm affects it only indirectly in the my model.
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Chapter 2
Customers’ Complaints and
Quality Regulation
2.1 Introduction
Customers’ complaints constitute an important source of consumer-generated
information. For instance, the European Union’s (2011) report “Monitoring Con-
sumer Markets in the European Union” states that customers’ complaints consti-
tute “a key metric to evaluate the functioning of a market” (page 12); as a result,
complaints are one of the elements the study takes into consideration in order
to derive conclusions about the market’s performance. Despite its relevance and
generalised use for policy purposes, very little is known about the informational
content of customers’ complaints. The conventional wisdom about the role of
complaints in a market is that the smaller the number of customers that com-
plain, the better the market performs -i.e., complaints are informative about the
distortions existing in a market. However, its theoretical foundations are not
clear.
Consider, for example, a firm’s decision to invest in improving its customer
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service department (hereafter, “quality”). Even though the consumers do not
observe the firm’s investment, it is likely that they are better informed than the
regulator about the quality of the service. Then, everything else constant, more
complaints may be indicative of lower quality. However, there is an important
caveat because consumers’ incentives to complain may vary across markets and
along time for at least two reasons. First, suppose, as the empirical evidence
suggests, that complaints are driven by expectations as well as by actual quality
and so, that they depend (at least partially) on consumers’ “disappointment”
with the quality they received (Forbes 2008).1 As a result, the definition of what
constitutes an “appropriate service level” is likely to change with the context; a
higher number of complaints may then be the result not of lower quality but of
higher expectations. Second, complaining is a costly action the benefits of which
cannot be always fully appropriated. For instance, if future investment increases
with current complaints but all the consumers benefit from the resulting higher
quality, then each individual consumer would prefer others to face the cost of
complaining. Hence, a smaller number of complaints may reflect a significant
degree of free riding incentives and not a higher quality.
This paper studies the informativeness of customers complaints about a firm’s
investment and their potential as a regulatory tool. The starting point is the as-
sumption that, as suggested by the empirical evidence, customers’ complaints
may be the result of either low quality or high expectations. As in the customer
service example, the paper considers some contexts in which quality is not verifi-
1The relationship between complaints and “disappointment” or “dissatisfaction” seems to
be generally accepted in Marketing Literature -see Oliver (1977), Singh (1988) and Boulding,
Kalra, Staelin, and Zeithaml (1993), among others. It also seems to be an accepted relationship
among regulatory agencies. For example, OFGEM defines complaints as “any expression of
dissatisfaction made to an organisation, related to any one or more of its products, its services
or the manner in which it has dealt with any such expression of dissatisfaction” OFGEM (2008)
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able2 and consumers cannot (fully) appropriate the benefits of their complaints.3
It is shown that, while a regulation based on complaints may induce a higher
investment, those complaints are not systematically informative about the firm’s
behaviour. As a result, the firm may be punished more frequently when it invests
than when it does not. Furthermore, the lack of informativeness may be worsen
by a repeated interaction between the firm and consumers, because it creates
incentives for the firm to try to “keep expectations low”.
The paper also identifies conditions under which complaints may help over-
come the regulator’s lack of information about the firm’s investment behaviour.
In particular, the results challenge the conventional wisdom that the easier it is
for consumers to complain the more information is contained in these complaints.
When the cost of lodging a complaint is zero, the amount of complaints becomes
independent of the quality received by the consumers and so they convey no in-
formation about the firm’s investment. Finally, the paper delivers comparative
static results on consumers’ complaining decisions that explain Forbes’s (2008)
empirical findings -namely, that the number of complaints decreases with actual
quality and that, after controlling for actual quality, consumers complain more
often when they would have expected to receive higher quality.
The paper proposes a psychological game between a monopoly firm and the
consumers. A regulated monopoly decides whether to make a costly investment
that increases quality. The consumers do not observe the firm’s investment, but
2Quality is verifiable when it can be (costlessly) described ex ante in a contract and ascer-
tained ex post by a court (Laffont and Tirole 1993). When quality is verifiable, the regulator
can reward or punish the firm directly as a function of the level of quality. It can, for example,
dictate the heating value of gas or punish an electric utility on the basis of the number and
intensity of outages (Laffont and Tirole 1993). On the contrary, when quality is not verifiable
it is not possible to write contracts contingent on outcomes.
3When the consumer expects to receive a direct benefit out of his complaint (like monetary
compensations because of electricity shortcuts or reimbursements of incorrectly high bills), his
complaining decision can be perfectly explained using standard microeconomic theory: the
consumer lodges a complaint as long as the (expected) cost is below the (expected) benefit.
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they observe a realisation of quality that is related to investment in a first order
stochastic dominance sense. After observing quality, consumers decide whether
to complain by comparing the realised quality with the one they were expecting
to receive. If a high proportion of consumers complains, the firm is fined. Con-
sumers’ reference point is determined by their rational expectations.4 In this way,
the model captures the idea that “disappointment” and “poor performance” are
endogenously defined and depend on the context. The presence of a reference
point in consumers’ complaining decisions implies that the payoff functions of
both the consumers and the firm depend not only on what they do but also on
what consumers were expecting from the firm, which reflects the psychological
aspect of the game.5
The combination of a reference point with a fine that depends on the number
of complaints implies that “disappointed” consumers consider lodging a complaint
only if by complaining they increase the probability that the firm is “punished”
for its “poor performance”. However, complaining is a costly action the bene-
fits of which the consumer cannot (fully) appropriate. Even more, since I make
the simplifying assumption that there is a continuum of consumers, the model
suffers from an extreme version of free riding and so, without additional assump-
tions, there would be no complaints in equilibrium. A similar result holds when
studying consumers’ incentives to participate in a large election. To tackle this
difficulty I borrow from the voting literature the assumption that a fraction of
the consumers are group-utilitarians, i.e., they receive a positive payoff for acting
according to a strategy that maximises consumers’ aggregate utility. Given their
disappointment, consumers have preferences about the probability with which
4Forbes (2008) assumes that consumers form an unbiased expectation of the quality they
will receive. With rational expectations, her empirical results imply that an increase in qual-
ity decreases the (expected) proportion of complaints only when the higher quality was not
anticipated by consumers. The same is true in the model of this paper.
5See, for example, Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989) and Battigalli and Dufwen-
berg (2009).
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the firm should be punished and the cost of complaining. These preferences
are not identical across consumers because complaining costs are heterogeneous.
The complaining rule maximises their (expected) aggregate utility, given their
disappointment and the regulatory rule. This rule consists of a cut off cost of
complaining below which a consumer lodges a complaint.6
An equilibrium of the complaining game satisfies three requirements.7 First,
the firm choses the investment level that maximises its expected profits given its
beliefs about the consumers’ strategy and expected quality. Second, consumers
choose their complaining strategy optimally given their disappointment with the
quality they received and their payoff for following the complaining rule. And
third, the firm correctly anticipates consumers’ expected quality, which is in turn
consistent with the firm’s strategy and the consumers’ prior beliefs. Using this
definition, the one-shot version of the model has two different equilibria: a “high
quality equilibrium” in which consumers expect the firm to invest and the firm
optimally invests, and a “low quality equilibrium” in which consumers do not
expect the firm to invest and the firm optimally fulfils those expectations.
The paper makes a methodological contribution because it proposes a novel
way of dealing with the well-known free riding problem that lies at the very root
of the generation of information by consumers. The notion of utilitarian agents
has been proposed by Harsanyi (1980) and formalised by Feddersen and San-
droni (2006a, 2006b), as a solution to the so-called “paradox of no-voting”.8 The
key insight of the utilitarian model is that the optimal probability of voting is
6In the context of a voting game, Feddersen and Sandroni (2006a) show that a behaviour rule
profile that defines rules such that each agent decides he must follow given a proper anticipation
of the behaviour of other agents can be described by cutoff points. Their result extends to the
application in this paper.
7See Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989)
8If voting is costly then, since the likelihood of a vote being pivotal is very small, standard
game-theoretic models predict low levels of turnout (Downs 1957).
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between zero and one: not everybody should stay at home, but not everybody
should vote either.9 This assumption is useful in the context of this paper be-
cause it constitutes a plausible explanation for consumers’ behaviour in settings
in which tangible benefits accrue only if aggregate participation is high, and no
one can be excluded from the benefits of group success. The application in this
paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first formal application of Harsanyi’s
ideas outside the area of Political Economy.
The model assumes the existence of a formal regulation based on complaints.
However, all that is needed for the results is that consumers’ complaining deci-
sion is driven by they disappointment with the quality they received and that
the firm is somehow “punished” when consumers complain (and the consumers
are aware of this possibility). This situation is more general than the regulatory
context I use for presentation purposes. Consider, for instance, a hotel chain that
tries to verify that each of its members delivers an appropriate level of service.
Clearly in this context what constitutes an “appropriate” service depends on the
consumers’ preferences. Thus, the chain may want to rely in customers’ feedback
to learn how much effort each of its members is exerting. When doing this, the
chain is assuming that the feedback given by consumers can be compared across
hotels and along time. The results in this paper suggest thar this is not always
the case.
There exist many other examples of the type of situation considered in this
paper. For example, Amazon keeps record of customers’ complaints about the
various companies that use the platform and may prevent them from continuing
9If everybody stays at home, the policy will not pass (or the favourite candidate has no
opportunity of winning the election), but everybody voting would result in a surfeit of votes,
imposing unnecessary costs on society. In this way, the logic of rule-utilitarianism yields an
elegant theory of turnout. Harsanyi (1980) assumes that everyone does their duty, but rejects
the implicit assumption that doing one’s duty always involves voting.
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to use it if the number of customers’ complaints is high enough.10 Amazon be-
haves in this case as a sort of “regulatory agency” that punishes the firm based on
the amount of complaints. Another clear example of customers’ “dissatisfaction”
that was followed by a firm being punished is the decision of some major retailers
to stop using the delivery services of Youdel -the biggest delivery service in the
United Kingdom, outside of Royal Mail.11 12
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The reminder of this section
briefly revises the existing literature and discusses the contributions made by this
paper. Section 2.2 presents the details of the model and describes the players
action spaces and payoff functions. It also discusses how consumers’ quality ex-
pectations are formed. Section 2.3 analyses the implications of complaints for
the firm’s investment decision in a one shot game. This exercise is useful because
it highlights most of the strategic considerations that will shape the equilibrium
when the game is repeated. This section also analyses how the equilibrium pro-
portion of complaints is affected by changes in the various parameters of the
model and how informative is that proportion about the firm’s investment. Sec-
tion 2.4 studies a repeated version of the complaining game. Finally, section 2.5
concludes.
Related Literature
The model in this paper contributes to the extensive literature on quality
provision by a monopoly. Starting with the seminal papers of Spence (1975) and
Shesinski (1982), the literature suggests that an unregulated monopoly will over
or under supply quality according to whether the marginal consumer values addi-
10This feature is independent of the well-known reviewing system that allows consumers and
buyers to rate each other (or among them).
11This includes major retailers like John Lewis, Mothercare and Matalan. (The Guardian
2012).
12According to The Guardian (2012) “about 5,000 customers posted messages in Amazon’s
online forums calling for the online retailing giant to stop using the parcel delivery company”.
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tional quality more or less highly than do infra-marginal consumers on average.13
It has further been shown that regulation of service prices can compound, amelio-
rate or otherwise complicate the already existing market failure (see for example,
Spence (1975), Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Besanko, Donnenfeld, and White
(1987); Sappington (2005) surveys the literature).14 The main conclusion of much
of the existing literature is that when quality is not verifiable the regulator needs
to have a great deal of information before even knowing in which direction he
should intervene. By studying the informational content of complaints, this pa-
per considers whether the “policing power” could be moved from the regulatory
agency to consumers.
This paper is also related to the literature on reference dependence utility15
and with some models in marketing research on customer satisfaction.16 In both
cases, it is suggested that consumers utility depends not only on the quality he
actually received but also on whether that quality was above or below some ref-
erence level. This paper adds to the first branch of literature because, in spite of
being widely accepted, the effect of that reference point on consumers’ complaint
decisions and on the firm’s incentives to invest have not been previously stud-
ied.17 It differs from the second branch in that they do not require consumers’
13The difference depends on whether quantity and quality are seen as substitutes or as
complements by consumers. In the former case, consumers willingness to pay a higher price for
an increase in quality decreases with the quantity that he buys (i.e., the demand curve becomes
less elastic as quality increases), while in the latter the elasticity of the demand increases with
quality. Thus, the monopoly is more likely to undersupply quality if quality and quantity are
substitutes, and to oversupply it if they are complements.
14Price ceilings that are independent of the firm’s realised costs limits its incentives to sup-
ply quality, because they prevent the firm from capturing any of the incremental consumer’s
surpluses that would result from the higher service quality. However, as noted by Laffont and
Tirole (1993), even under pure cost-of-service regulation, the regulated firm does not gain from
providing costly services either, so a low perceived cost of supplying quality does not imply a
high incentive to provide quality.
15Kahneman and Tversky (2001), Koszegi and Rabin (2006), among others.
16See for example, Singh (1988), Zithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman (1996), Boulding, Kalra,
Staelin, and Zeithaml (1993), Oliver (1977), Oliver (1980).
17In a different context, Akerlof (2010) shows that norms may be followed because a failure
to do so provokes anger and (potentially) punishment.
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expectations to be rational and, as a result, they are not able to make clear pre-
dictions about the firm’s strategic response to consumers’ complaints.
Apart from the application in this paper and the voting literature, Harsanyi
(1980)-type arguments have also been used to explain household responses to
conservation appeals during the California’s energy crisis in 2000 and 2001. Reiss
and White (2008) find empirical evidence that consumers do respond to volun-
tary appeals provided the costs of a collective action failure are tangible and that
the public is well aware of it. In this case, each household faces private costs of
reducing consumption, a virtually zero possibility of bringing about any tangible
benefit with respect to the crisis through individual effort, and a considerable
incentive to free-ride on whatever efforts are made by others. The nature of in-
dividual free-rider problems here and the lack of private incentives for electricity
conservation leave largely “moral suasion”-type arguments to explain their be-
haviour: consumers individually wanting to“do their part” to mitigate the crisis.
2.2 The Model
This section presents a static game of quality regulation based on customers’
complaints. A regulated monopoly decides whether to make a costly investment
that increases the level of quality received by the consumers in a first order
stochastic dominance sense. After observing a quality realisation, the consumers
may file a complaint to “inform” the regulator they received a low quality realisa-
tion. The regulatory agency is not an strategic player, it observes the proportion
of customers that complained (δ) and fines the firm if that proportion is above a
threshold δ¯. The fine equals m times the firm’s revenues, with a probability that
is proportional to the level of complaints. Hence, a regulatory rule consists of a
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pair (δ¯, m) ∈ [0, 1]2 of parameters that are public information.
The model assumes that customers complain if they feel disappointed with the
quality they received and consider the firm should be punished for its “poor per-
formance”. Consumers’ disappointment is defined as the difference between the
level of quality they were expecting to receive (zˆ) and the one they actually re-
ceived (q). If they are disappointed, the consumers consider the regulator should
fine the firm and so they complain in order to increase the probability with which
the firm is punished. The fact that consumers’ prior expectations affect their
complaining behaviour implies that the complaining game belongs to the class of
psychological games.18
The firm faces a unit demand for its product and an exogenously given price,
p (a binding price cap). Thus, its revenues are deterministic and independent of
its investment decision.19 As a result, its only incentive to invest in quality is to
reduce the (expected) proportion of complaints and, hence, the expected value of
the fine.
The section proceeds as follows. Section 2.2.1 presents the payoff function
of the consumers and discusses their complaining decision, while section 2.2.2
considers the firm’s investment decision. Finally, section 2.2.3 explains how con-
sumers’ expectations are formed.
18Psychological games differ from standard games in that the domain of the utility function
includes explicitly the beliefs a player holds about the other players’ strategies. As a result,
payoffs at a given endnode are endogenous: beliefs determine the player’s utility and they are
explained/predicted via some solution concept (Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009), Geanakoplos,
Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989)). In the context of this paper, this means that a given level of
investment may lead to different final payoffs for different pre-play beliefs (consumers expected
quality). The standard assumption is that beliefs are correct in equilibrium, and that is the
condition I impose in the equilibrium definitions of sections 2.3 and 2.4.
19This implies that the firm’s investment in quality is not aimed at increasing future demand;
see Shapiro (1982) for model a in which the firm’s incentives to investment are related with
future demand.
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2.2.1 The Consumers
There is a continuum of consumers normalised to size one. After receiving
a quality draw, each consumer decides whether to lodge a complain. Hence, his
action space is Ci ∈ {0, 1}, where Ci = 1 means consumer i files a complaint.
Each consumer’s utility is the sum of the consumption utility he derives from the
quality he received and, if he makes a complaint, his payoff from complaining.
The consumer’s payoff from complaining depends on his disappointment and on
his cost of complaining, but also on whether the firm is punished for its “poor
performance”. Each consumer i faces a cost of complaining σic, where σi is the
realisation of a random variable uniformly distributed over [0, 1], and c is a pos-
itive constant. σi is independent of any other random variable in the model.
Consumers do not observe the cost of other consumers, but do know the distri-
bution from which they are drawn. The utility of an individual consumer i with
cost cσi, who was expecting zˆ and received q is:
Ui(Ci; q, zˆ, σi) = q + θ(zˆ − q)1{δ≥δ¯}(δ)− Cicσi (2.1)
where θ ∈ (0, 1) can be interpreted as the consumer’s marginal utility per unit of
punished-disappointment and the indicator function 1{δ≥δ¯}{δ} ∈ {0, 1} takes the
value 1 if the firm is fined (i.e., if δ ≥ δ¯) and zero otherwise.20 Implicit in the
utility function is the additional assumption that consumers heterogeneity is re-
stricted to individual costs of complaining (σi); this means that all the consumers
have the same willingness to complain and the same intensity of preferences over
20θ < 1 implies that, everything else constant, individual utility is an increasing function of
quality.
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quality. The assumption is relevant in that it sidesteps the question of how the
burden of complaining should be shared among consumers with different intensi-
ties of preferences.
The utility function reflects the assumption that the consumer complains in
order to “punish the firm’s poor performance”. The consumer receives a positive
payoff only if q < zˆ and the firm is fined. The implications in terms of com-
plaining behaviour are twofold. First, if the realised quality is above the quality
the consumer was expecting to receive he will not lodge a complain. Second, a
disappointed consumer is willing to face the cost of complaining if by doing so he
increases the probability with which the firm is punished.
However, individual consumers cannot appropriate the benefits of their com-
plaints. If the firm is fined, every consumer receives a payoff θ(zˆ − q) indepen-
dently of whether he made a complaint or not. Only those agents who actually
filed a complaint (Ci = 1) face the costs. As there is continuum of consumers,
the model as defined so far suffers from an extreme version of free-riding. Hence,
without additional assumptions there would be no complaints in equilibrium. To
overcome this limitation, I borrow from the voting literature the assumption that
consumers are “group - utilitarians”: they receive a positive payoff for acting
according to a strategy that maximises consumers’ aggregate utility.21 Formally,
the utilitarian assumption implies that the group’s problem is strategically equiv-
alent to a one person decision problem with payoff function defined as consumers’
aggregate (expected) utility.22
21The qualitative results would not change if only a proportion γ ∈ (0, 1) of consumers were
group utilitarians, as long as either γ or the distribution from which it is drawn, is public
information.
22As discussed by Feddersen and Sandroni (2006a), one possible intuition is that, if a con-
sumer believes that all the other utilitarian agents will use the same strategy as he does himself,
he will independently decide that the right strategy is the one that maximises aggregate utility.
In this way, a consumer will be willing to face the cost of complaining even though he under-
stands that his single complaint has no effect on the final outcome. However, the mathematical
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Let a social rule σ′ be a cut off that specifies a critical cost level below which
a consumer makes a complaint.23 By the law a large numbers, the proportion of
complaints equals the cut off cost, i.e. δ = σ′. The utilitarian assumption implies
that the group’s expected utility from following a rule σ′, when they received
quality q and were expecting zˆ, is:24
EU(σ′; q, zˆ) =
 q + θ(zˆ − q)σ
′ − c
2
σ′2 if σ′ ≥ δ¯
q − c
2
σ′2 if σ′ < δ¯
(2.2)
Consumers’ complaining decision is made after they observed quality. Given
their disappointment, the consumers problem is to choose the cut off rule σ∗ that
maximises (2.2). Thus, consumers’ strategy is a mapping from their disappoint-
ment (zˆ − q) into a cutoff point between zero and one: σ(q; zˆ) : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1].
The cut off rule that maximises consumers’ expected utility, given a realisation
of quality and consumers’ expectations, is:25
structure of the model is equivalent to the one in elite driven turnout models. In the complain-
ing game of this paper, this second interpretation could mean, for example, that consumers
follow the directions of some sort of Consumers’ Associations.
23Given a social rule σ′, a (utilitarian) consumer’s action is:
Ci(σi, σ′) =
{
1 if σi < σ
′
0 otherwise
24Expectation is taken with respect to the rule σ′. The probability that an agent makes
a complaint is Prob(σi ≤ σ′) = σ′. The expected cost of complaining, conditional on the
consumer effectively making a complaint is E(σi|σi ≤ σ′) = (1/σ′)
∫ σ′
0
xdx = σ′/2.
25σ∗(q; zˆ) could in principle take any value in the interval [0, 1]; however, it is clear from
(2.2) that values of σ∗ different from zero but smaller than δ¯ cannot be optimal. Consumers’
optimisation problem can then be written as: Maxσ{EU(q, 0); Maxσ∈[δ¯,1] EU(q, σ(q; zˆ))}.
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σ∗(q; zˆ) =

1 if q ≤ zˆ − ψ
θ(zˆ−q)
c
if zˆ − ψ < q ≤ zˆ − δ¯ψ
δ¯ if zˆ − δ¯ψ < q ≤ zˆ − δ¯ψ
2
0 Otherwise
(2.3)
where ψ = c
θ
. Given zˆ, the proportion of complaints induced by σ∗ is decreasing
in the realised quality: the smaller is q the higher is consumers’ disappointment
and so is the cost they are willing to face in order to have the firm punished.
The optimal cut-off rule is shown in Figure 2.1. The flat regions for very low
quality realisations and for q ∈ (zˆ− δ¯ψ,≤ zˆ− δ¯ψ
2
] are due to the restrictions that
the proportion of complaints cannot be higher than 1 in the first case, and that
the probability of fine becomes zero for σ∗ < δ¯ in the latter.26 Finally, note that
there is a “region of tolerance” in which consumers do not complain despite the
realised quality being below zˆ. Within this region, the group’s disappointment is
not high enough to compensate the cost of a proportion of complaints equal to
or greater than δ¯.27 This result supports some arguments made in the marketing
literature that define a “zone of tolerance” within which “the company is meeting
customer expectations” (Singh 1988).28
2.2.2 The Firm’s Investment Decision
The firm is risk neutral and seeks to maximise expected profits. It can be
of any of two types, “bad” (B) or “good” (G). The good firm’s investment is
26Consumers’ optimal strategy in (2.3) implicitly assumes that when the realised quality is
exactly zˆ − δ¯c2θ consumers do complaint, even though they are indifferent between complaining
in a proportion δ¯ and not complaining at all. The exact way in which this indifference is broken
does not affect the results.
27Not even utilitarian consumers would follow a social rule that directs a positive proportion
of consumers to complain within this region of quality realisations.
28According to (Singh 1988), this region is delimited by the desired service level and the
adequate service level (i.e., the level of service the customer will accept).
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Figure 2.1: Relationship between σ∗ and q
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a binary decision IG ∈ {L,H}, where H means the firm invests and delivers
higher (expected) quality and L means it does not invest (and hence, it delivers
low quality). The bad firm has a singleton action space IB ∈ {L}. In order to
keep the model tractable, it is assumed that quality is uniformly distributed over
[0, 1/2] if the firm is bad or if it is of the good type but it does not invest, and
q ∼ U [0, 1] if the good firm invests.29 The firm has private information about its
type. To simplify notation, I is used as a shorthand notation for IG. Investing in
increasing quality costs h > 0. This investment cost is independent of any other
cost faced by the company and it is public information.30 The firm also faces a
(potential) cost derived from the fine. If the proportion of complaints, δ, is above
the threshold δ¯, the firm is fined with a probability equal to δ. Then, given a
proportion of complaints δ, the good firm’s profits are:
29The uniform distributions simplify the exposition by allowing closed form solution for the
expected proportion of complaints. However, all my findings remain true for a more general
class of quality distributions as long as F (q; I = H) ≤ F (q; I = L) ∀ q (with strict inequality
for some q).
30Results would not change if we assume that the regulator cannot observe the firm’s costs.
All that is required is that it is able to observe the proportion of complaints and the firm’s
revenues.
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Π(I, δ) =
 p− 1I=H{I} · h−mp if δ ≥ δ¯ and the firm is finedp− 1I=H{I} · h otherwise (2.4)
where 1H{I} is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the firm invests
(I = H) and zero otherwise; p denotes the firm’s revenues and mpδ is the fine
payed by the firm.
The firm’s expected cost depends on the observed proportion of complaints,
which in turn depends on the realised quality, the quality the consumers were
expecting to receive and their complaining strategy. When the firm makes its
investment decision, it does not observe the level of quality consumers expect to
receive, but it does have some beliefs about it, ˆˆz.31 Given those beliefs, the good
firm’s expected payoff is the expectation of (2.4) with respect to the probability
measure over quality induced by its investment strategy. The expected propor-
tion of complaints when the firm invests I is EqIδ(qI , ˆˆz, σ). The firm’s optimal
action depends on the trade-off between the cost of investment and the expected
fine: by not investing, the firm reduces its costs by h, but it also makes it less
likely that quality meets consumers’ expectations, increasing the expected value
of the fine. To simplify notation, denote piH(ˆˆz, σ) = EqHΠ(H, δ(qH , ˆˆz, σ)) and
piL(ˆˆz, σ) = EqLΠ(L, δ(qL, ˆˆz, σ)). Given its beliefs about the level of quality con-
sumers’ expect to receive, the firm invests if and only if:
31Consumers’ complaining decision depends on their prior expectations, so the firm needs
to form some beliefs about them in order to decide the level of investment that maximises its
profits; ˆˆz denotes the firm’s belief about zˆ.
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piH(ˆˆz, σ) ≥ piL(ˆˆz, σ) ⇐⇒ [EqLδ(qL, ˆˆz, σ)− EqHδ(qH , ˆˆz, σ)] ≥
h
mp
(2.5)
The firm’s investment strategy is a function from the level of quality the firm
believes consumers expect to receive (ˆˆz) to an investment level: I : ˆˆz → {L,H}.
Denote by ˆˆz∗ the level of ˆˆz at which the firm is indifferent between investing and
not investing; h
mp
is constant and independent of consumers’ expectations, but
the change in the expected proportion of complaints when the firm’s investment
changes is an increasing function of ˆˆz. Then, the firm’s optimal strategy is a
cut-off of the form:
I∗ =
 H if
ˆˆz ≥ ˆˆz∗
L if ˆˆz < ˆˆz∗
The firm’s strategy is increasing in consumers’ expectations. When consumers
expect too much from the firm, the firm’s best reply is to fulfil those expectations,
as otherwise the fine becomes too heavy. However the firm also fulfils consumers
prior expectations when they are low, because if consumers do not expect much,
their disappointment is not very high and the (expected) proportion of complaints
is not enough to compensate the cost of investment (h).
2.2.3 Consumers’ Beliefs and Expectations
The level of quality consumers expect to receive is determined by their beliefs
about the type and strategy of the firm, and the equilibrium condition requires
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those beliefs to be correct.32 Denote by q¯B =
∫
B
q · f(q;B)dq the average quality
that is delivered by the bad type of the firm, and by q¯G,I =
∫
G,I
q · f(q;G, I)dq
the average quality that is delivered by the good firm if it invests I:
q¯G,I =
 q¯G,H if I = Hq¯G,L if I = L
Then, the level of quality consumers expect to receive is:33
zˆI(τ) =
 τ q¯G,H + (1− τ)q¯B if I = Hτq¯G,L + (1− τ)q¯B if I = L
where τ is the probability consumers assign to the firm being good.
2.3 Equilibrium
The firm and the consumers choose their actions according to their prior be-
liefs without observing each other’s action, and the consumers do not observe the
type of the firm neither. The equilibrium concept I use is, therefore, Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium. In this application, such an equilibrium needs to satisfy three
requirements.34 First, the firm chooses the investment level that maximises its
expected profits given its beliefs about consumers’ cut off rule and expected qual-
ity. Second, consumers choose the complaining rule optimally given their disap-
pointment with the quality they received (i.e., given zˆ and q). And third, the firm
correctly anticipates consumers’ expected quality, which is in turn consistent with
32This assumption rules out beliefs structures in which, for example, the consumer reduces
his prior expectations so that he does not feel disappointed if the quality realisation is low. For
models of belief-dependent preferences in which the agents can choose beliefs see Akerlof and
Dickens (1982) or Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), for example.
33Consumers’ beliefs about the firm’s strategy are they “first order beliefs”, defined as a
probability distribution over the firm’s action space (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2009). As I
consider only pure strategies, consumers’ first order beliefs assign probability one or zero to the
event in which the good firm invests.
34Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989)
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the firm’s strategy and consumers’ prior about its type, τ . Definition 1 formalises
the equilibrium requirements.
Definition 1. Equilibrium in the Static Game. An equilibrium of the complaining
game when T = 1 is a pair of strategies (I∗, σ∗) and expected qualities (ˆˆz, zˆ) for
which the following conditions are satisfied:
1. I∗ maximises the firm’s expected profits given ˆˆz and σ∗
2. σ∗ maximizes consumers’ expected utility given zˆ
3. ˆˆz = zˆ = zˆI∗(τ)
The expected proportion of complaints when the good type of the firm invests
is EqH (σ∗(q; zˆ)) = zˆ − ψ2 , and when it does not invest (or when the firm is bad)
is EqL(σ∗(q; zˆ)) = 2zˆ − ψ.35 Then, the cut off point in the firm’s strategy is
ˆˆz∗ = h
mp
+ ψ
2
; ˆˆz∗ is determined by the magnitude of the “punishment” (mp) rel-
ative to the investment cost (h), and by consumers’ relative cost of complaining
(ψ = c
θ
). The less harsh the punishment or the more difficult it is for consumers
to complain, the higher is ˆˆz∗ and thus the higher is the ˆˆz required for the firm’s
optimal action to be I = H.
The static game has a separating and a pooling equilibrium. In the first case,
the good type of the firm invests and differentiates itself from the other type with
a positive probability. In the second case, the firm does not invest and so it cam-
ouflages itself with the bad type. Define a “High Quality Equilibrium” (HQE) as
one in which the good type of the firm invests, and a “Low Quality Equilibrium”
(LQE) as one in which it does not. Given the equilibrium definition above, a
HQE exists if and only if piH(ˆˆzH , σ
∗) ≥ piL(ˆˆzH , σ∗), while a LQE exists if and only
35EqH (σ∗(q; zˆ)) is the expectation of consumers’ optimal strategy when q ∼ U [0, 1], and
EqL(σ∗(q; zˆ)) is the expectation when q ∼ U [0, 1/2]. See Appendix A.1 for details.
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if piL(ˆˆzL, σ
∗) ≥ piH(ˆˆzL, σ∗).36
Proposition 1. Equilibria of the Static Game. Given ψ < 1
4
and τ ∈ (0, 1):
1. If ˆˆz∗ ≥ 1
2
a unique low quality equilibrium exists.
2. If ˆˆz∗ ∈ (1
4
, 1
2
) there exists τ ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that a unique low quality equi-
librium exists for τ ∈ (0, τ ∗), but high and low quality equilibria coexist for
τ ∈ [τ ∗, 1)
3. If ˆˆz∗ ≤ 1
4
a unique high quality equilibrium exists.
Proof. In equilibrium the firm has correct beliefs about the level of quality con-
sumers expect to receive, so ˆˆz = zˆ. Given that the distributions of quality are
public information, zˆH(τ) =
1
4
+ 1
4
τ and zˆL =
1
4
.37 The firm’s optimal strat-
egy depends on whether zˆ is greater than or smaller than ˆˆz∗. There are three
possibilities:
• When ˆˆz∗ ≥ 1/2, the cost of investing in quality is high relative to the
(expected) punishment, zˆL < zˆH(τ) ≤ ˆˆz∗, and as a result piL(ˆˆzL, σ∗) >
piH(ˆˆzL, σ
∗) and piL(ˆˆzH(τ), σ∗) > piH(ˆˆzH(τ), σ∗). The firm’s optimal strat-
egy is I = L, independently of consumers expectations, and so rational
consumers do not expect something different from low quality. There is a
unique low quality equilibrium.
36piL(ˆˆzH , σ
∗) and piH(ˆˆzL, σ∗) cannot be the firm’s profits in any equilibrium of the game, as
they both fail to comply with the “correct beliefs” requirement of Definition 1. In both cases,
the firm’s actual investment differs from its believes about zˆ, meaning that either the firm has
incorrect beliefs about the level of quality consumers expect to receive or that the firm’s beliefs
are correct but consumers expectations are not consistent with the firm’s investment strategy.
37When I = L, the good firm does not differentiate itself from the bad one. Thus, consumers’
expected quality, zˆL, is independent of τ (and so is ˆˆzL).
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• If ˆˆz∗ ∈ (1
4
, 1
2
), there exists a unique τ ∗ such that zˆH(τ ∗) = ˆˆz∗. Unique-
ness is given by the fact that zˆH(τ) ∈ [14 , 12 ] and is a monotone and in-
creasing function of τ , while ˆˆz∗ belongs to the same interval but is exoge-
nous and independent of τ . For τ < τ ∗, ˆˆz∗ > zˆH(τ) > zˆL, implying that
piL(ˆˆzL, σ
∗) > piH(ˆˆzL, σ∗) and piL(ˆˆzH(τ), σ∗) > piH(ˆˆzH(τ), σ∗). The firm’s
optimal strategy is I = L ∀ ˆˆz, and there exists a unique low quality equi-
librium. As τ increases so does the level of quality consumers expect to
receive if they anticipate I∗ = H. For τ ≥ τ ∗, zˆH(τ) ≥ ˆˆz∗ > zˆL and
piL(ˆˆzL, σ
∗) > piH(ˆˆzL, σ∗) and piH(ˆˆzH(τ), σ∗) > piL(ˆˆzH(τ), σ∗) and so there are
two equilibria: the firm optimally invests if consumers expect high quality
(HQE) and the firm does not invest if consumers’ expected quality is zˆL
(LQE).
• If ˆˆz∗ ≤ 1/4, the (expected) punishment is harsh relative to h and ˆˆz∗ ≤
zˆL < zˆH(τ) ∀τ ∈ (0, 1). In this case piH(ˆˆzH(τ), σ∗) > piL(ˆˆzH(τ), σ∗) and
piH(ˆˆzL, σ
∗) > piL(ˆˆzL). Then, investing is the firm’s optimal strategy. As
consumers anticipate this, they expect high quality (zˆH(τ)) and there is a
unique high quality equilibrium.
As shown in Appendix A.1, the condition ψ < 1/4 is sufficient but not neces-
sary for the results in this section and in the next ones. This condition guarantees
that there exists a positive probability of complain for every quality realisation.
Proposition 1 shows how a regulatory rule based on customers complaints
affects the monopoly’s investment behaviour. Such a rule induces a higher in-
vestment in quality as long as the punishment is “harsh enough”. In the context
of this paper this requires not only that the size of the fine -the proportion of
revenues lost in case of a fine (mp)- is high relative to the cost of investment (h)
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but also that the consumers do transmit their dissatisfaction to the regulator.
Both conditions are summarised by the parameter ˆˆz∗: a high value of ˆˆz∗ reflects
a reduced effectiveness of the punishment, either because the cost of investment
is high relative to the fine or because consumers’ relative cost of complaining is
high (ψ = c
θ
). Therefore, as ˆˆz∗ increases the game moves towards a low quality
equilibrium.
The quality consumers expect to receive is higher when they believe the firm is
investing, but also when they assign a higher probability to the firm being of the
good type -i.e., consumers expect more from a good firm. As a result, the firm’s
payoff in a HQE is a decreasing function of τ : the more convinced consumers
are that they are facing a good firm, the more they expect and so the higher is
the (expected) proportion of complaints and the lower are the firm’s (expected)
profits. Furthermore, the closer is τ to one, the smaller is the size of the fine
required to induce investment (m).
It is worth noting, however, that the change in the set of equilibria resulting
from the introduction of the fine does not necessarily imply an increase in total
welfare. The (average) quality in a low quality equilibrium is the same that would
be delivered without the regulatory rule. The firm’s expected profits, however,
are smaller after the introduction of the regulation because it faces a positive
probability of fine. An equivalent statement about the change in consumers’ wel-
fare with and without the regulatory rule is less clear because it is assumed that
they derive some positive utility from complaining.
In a high quality equilibrium the firm optimally invests because the cost of
investing is smaller than the fine it would have to pay if a low realisation of qual-
ity results in a high proportion of complaints. Even though the level of quality
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consumers receive in this case is higher than without the regulation, the cost of
that quality exceeds the cost of investing by the expected fine (because there is
a positive probability of fine). As this creates an inefficiency, the result is only
a “second best” result. Furthermore, the cost of delivering a higher quality is
increasing in consumers’ expectations and so the more convinced are consumers
that the firm is of the good type, the higher is the cost of the quality increase.
2.3.1 Informativeness of Complaints
The regulatory agency may be interested in punishing the firm more harshly
when it is not investing. However, the proportion of complaints observed by the
regulator reflects consumers’ disappointment with the quality they received and
not necessarily the quality itself. This section identifies conditions under which
a higher proportion of complaints reflects both a higher disappointment and a
lower investment - i.e., when EqL(σ∗(q; zˆL)) ≥ EqH (σ∗(q; zˆH)). If this is the case,
I say that complaints are informative about the equilibrium being played.
Given zˆ, the expected proportion of complaints is lower in a separating than in
a pooling equilibrium because the probability of high quality realisations is higher
when the firm invests -i.e., EqL(σ∗(q; zˆ)) ≥ EqH (σ∗(q; zˆ)). However, in equilibrium
consumers have correct beliefs about the firm’s strategy and they modify their
expectations accordingly. Because consumers expectations are higher in a high
quality equilibrium, it is not clear whether they will complain more when the
firm is not investing. Lemma 1 presents the conditions under which complaints
are informative in the one shot game. In order to study the informativeness of
complaints, I focus on the set of parameters for which a high quality and a low
quality equilibria coexist.
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Lemma 1. Given ˆˆz∗ ∈ (1
4
, 1
2
), complaints are informative about the equilibrium
being played if and only if the following conditions hold:
1. τ ∈ (τ ∗, 1− 2ψ), were τ ∗ is such that zˆH(τ ∗) = ˆˆz∗
2. ψ ∈ (0, 1
2
− h
mp
)
Proof. First, note that the definition of informativeness of complaints is based in
the existence of multiple equilibria, so the analysis is restricted to τ > τ ∗ and
ˆˆz∗ ∈ (1
4
, 1
2
). EqL(σ∗(q; zˆL)) > EqH (σ∗(q; zˆH(τ)) if and only if 2zˆL − zˆH(τ) > ψ2
(where ψ = c
θ
). Given the distributions of quality in each case, zˆL =
1
4
and
zˆH(τ) =
1
4
+ 1
4
τ , which is an increasing function of τ . Then, the expected propor-
tion of complaints is higher in a LQE than in a HQE for values of τ ∈ (τ ∗, 1−2ψ),
and part (1) of the Lemma holds.
The second part of the Lemma implies that for complaints to be informative,
complaining must be “neither too cheap nor too costly”. When the relative cost
of complaining, ψ, is zero the expected utility in (2.2) is maximised when every
consumers complains if zˆ > q (because σ∗ = 1 maximises the probability that
the firm is fined) and when nobody complaints if zˆ ≤ q.38 Then, the proportion
of complaints becomes constant and independent of consumers’ disappointment.
Finally, when complaining is very costly, complaints are not informative because
the set of τ ’s determined in the previous paragraph is empty. τ ∈ (τ ∗, 1 − 2ψ)
is not an empty set if 1 − 2ψ ≥ τ ∗. From Proposition 1, τ ∗ = 4ˆˆz∗ − 1, where
ˆˆz∗ = h
mp
+ ψ
2
. Then, the second condition in the Lemma implies that complaints
are informative only for values of ψ in the set (0, 1
2
− h
mp
) -which is smaller than
the set induced by the condition that ˆˆz∗ ≤ 1/2.
The Lemma shows that complaints are not always a good signal of the firm’s
38Note that ψ = 0 may be the result of either c = 0 or θ →∞.
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investment. Consumers complaints are not informative of the equilibrium being
played whenever the change in their disappointment between the low and the
high quality equilibria is driven by a change in their expectations and not by a
change in the (average) quality being delivered by the firm. When consumers are
reasonably convinced that the firm is “good” (high τ), zˆ increases more than the
(average) realisations of quality and so complaints are (on expectations) higher
in an equilibrium in which the firm invests. In this case, complaints are infor-
mative about how disappointed consumers are with the quality they received but
not about the firm’s investment. As a result, the firm might be punished more
harshly when it is investing than when it is not.
The condition τ ≤ 1 − 2ψ means that, given τ , the informativeness of com-
plaints decreases if ψ increases -i.e., if the cost of making a complaint is higher
relative to consumers’ willingness to complain. Hence, the informativeness of
complaints depends also on how easy it is for consumers to complain. The result
in the Lemma shows that if complaining is too costly, the level of disappointment
required for consumers to be willing to face the cost of “informing” the regulator
is too high and so the regulator observes only a small proportion of complaints
-i.e., consumers do not complain enough so as to transmit information to the
regulator. On the other extreme, if c = 0 the optimal social norm becomes inde-
pendent of the size of the difference between expected and realised quality, and
the (expected) proportion of complaints is the same in both equilibria.39 When
complaining is very cheap, the proportion of consumers that lodge a complain is
so high that complaints become meaningless.
The limited informativeness of complaints is due to the fact that consumers’
complaining decision does not depend solely on the realisation of quality but also
39When c = 0, ˆˆz∗ = hmp and the firm’s incentives to invest depend solely on the relative
magnitude of the investment cost and the fine.
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on their prior expectations. As a result, there is not a unique relationship be-
tween the proportion of complaints and the firm’s investing behaviour. However,
the existence of a reference point is a necessary condition for the existence of a
positive proportion of complaints in any equilibrium of the game.
2.3.2 Comparative Static of the Optimal Complaining Rule
The optimal rule in (2.3) can be used to derive predictions about the way in
which complaints depend on the exogenous variables in both, consumers’ indi-
vidual utility and the regulatory rule. Those predictions are summarised in the
following properties. Figure 2.2 presents the changes in the optimal complaining
rule resulting from the properties below. In all the cases, the continuous line
represents consumers’ optimal strategy before the change and the dashed line is
their optimal strategy after it.
Property 1. The (expected) proportion of complaints is increasing in consumers’
prior expectations.
A higher zˆ increases consumers’ disappointment with every realisation of qual-
ity (q), and so consumers are willing to accept the higher social cost that results
from an increase in the cutoff point. This effect is showed in Figure 2.2a.
Property 2. Given consumers’ disappointment, the optimal social rule decreases
when ψ = c
θ
increases.
An increase in c or a decrease in θ implies that the relative utility consumers
derive from complaining is reduced. As a result, the optimal proportion of com-
plaints for any given quality realisation is smaller. The only exception are very
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low realisations for which it is still optimal to direct every ethical agent to com-
plaint.
Property 3. An increase in δ¯ makes it more costly for consumers to punish the
firm when quality realisations are relatively high.
A higher δ¯ makes it more difficult for consumers to meet the regulator’s re-
quirements and so it increases the group’s cost of punishing the firm for high
levels of quality, when the payoff of complaining is relatively low. For realisations
of quality that induce a σ∗ > δ¯, the change in δ¯ does not affect the optimal cut
off rule.
2.4 The Repeated Game
In this section I explore how the repetition of the game affects the firm’s in-
centives to invest in quality and the informativeness of consumers’ complaints.
When the complaining game is played repeatedly, consumers’ beliefs are updated
at the end of every period and so their reference point changes over time. The
firm’s strategy depends on consumers current expectations, but also on how to-
day’s investment affects the level of quality they expect to receive in the future:
higher investment in a given period reduces that period’s expected fine but it in-
creases consumers’ future expectations and so it increases the probability of being
fined in the future. In this way, the repetition of the game generates incentives
for the good firm to induce particular beliefs in the consumers.40 The main result
is that a repeated interaction between the consumers and the firm may reduce
both the firm’s incentives to invest and the informativeness of complaints. The
later is due to the fact that the adverse effect on investment is stronger for values
40The psychological aspect of the game means that current actions affect future play like in
standard dynamic games, but they also affect players’ beliefs and, because beliefs affect payoffs,
current actions affect future payoff for any possible action.
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Figure 2.2: Changes in the Optimal Cutoff as the Parameters Change
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of the parameters for which complaints would have been informative in the one
shot game: by not investing in any of the T periods, the firm keeps consumers’
expectations (and the proportion of complaints) low, and so the regulator can
not infer the lack of investment from the proportion of consumers that complain.
The public information in period t is the history of past quality realisations
and the proportion of consumers’ complaints, ht = (q1, σ1; q2, σ2; . . . ; qt−1, σt−1)
for t ≥ 2. The set of public histories is then H = [0, 1]2(T−1). When making
a complaining decision, consumers know the public history up to that moment
but they also have private information about the level of quality they expect to
receive (and the level they expected in any previous period). The set of their
private histories is then defined as HC =
⋃T
t=1H
t
C , where H
t
C = [0, 1]
3(t−1).
Consumers’ optimal rule maximises the present value of their expected utility,
σ∗k ∈ arg max ΣTk=tβk−1EU(σk; qk, zˆk) and so, their strategy in the repeated game
is a sequence of complaining decisions {σk}Tk=t, each of which maps their pri-
vate history and the current period quality into a cutoff between zero and one,
σt : H
t
C × [0, 1]→ [0, 1].41
The firm has information about past quality and complaints, but also about
its own past actions and its beliefs about consumers’ expectations. Then, a pri-
vate history for the good type of the firm includes both the public history and
the history of its investment decisions and beliefs. The firm’s private history up
to period t is H tG = {L,H}t−1 × [0, 1]3(t−1) and the set of all possible private
41Consumers make their period-t complaining decision after observing the realisation of qt,
so this last quality realisation also forms part of the information they have when deciding how
strongly to complain. Also note that individual consumers have private information about their
costs of complaining and actions. However, the group utilitarian assumption implies that their
strategy is the same that would result if there were only one “big” consumer. As a result,
the only relevant information is the distribution of the costs of complaining (which is public
information). The latter holds because, as there is a continuous of anonymous consumers,
each of them can do no better than myopically follow the complaining rule. See Maliath and
Samuelson (2006).
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histories for the firm is HG =
⋃T
t=1H
t
G. The strategy of the good type of the
firm in period t is a sequence {Ik}Tk=t that assigns, in each period, an investment
level for any possible private history, It : H
t
G → {L,H}. The firm’s investment
decision in period t (I∗t ) maximises the present value of its profits, which is the
expectation with respect to the probability distribution induced by the current
investment; this implies that given a history H tG, I
∗
t solves:
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max
It∈{L,H}
piIt(ˆˆzt, σ
∗
t ) + EIt [ΣTk=t+1βk−tpiIk(ˆˆzk, σ
∗
k)] (2.6)
The equilibrium of the repeated game requires players behaviour to be opti-
mal in every period given their beliefs about the other players’ type and strategy
but also their understanding of the way in which current behaviour affects fu-
ture payoffs. At the end of every period consumers update their beliefs about
the type of the firm and form some expectations about the level of quality they
should receive in the following period. The equilibrium requires consumers’ be-
liefs to be correct in the sense of being consistent with the firm’s strategy in the
repeated game. Beliefs about the type of the firm are required to be consistent
in a bayesian way. At the beginning of the game consumers assign a probability
τ1 to the firm being good. At the end of each period they update that probabil-
ity using Bayes’ rule (and the firm’s strategy). It is worth mentioning that the
probability distributions I am assuming imply that quality realisations between
zero and 1/2 can not be off the equilibrium path, while realisations higher than
1/2 can be off the equilibrium path but they are fully revealing of the firm’s type.
Definition 2 formalises the requirements for an equilibrium.
42Recall that piI(ˆˆz, σ) = EqIΠ(I, δ(qI , ˆˆz, σ))
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Definition 2. An equilibrium of the complaining game when T > 1 is a sequence
of strategies {I∗t , σ∗t }Tt=1 and expected qualities {ˆˆzt, zˆt}Tt=1 such that:
1. For each htG ∈ H tG , I∗t maximises the present value of the firm’s expected
profits.
2. For each htC ∈ H tC, σ∗t maximises the present value of consumers expected
utility.
3. For each htG ∈ H tG the firm has correct beliefs about the level of quality
consumers expect (ˆˆzt = zˆt) and consumers expectations are consistent with
the equilibrium strategies in the repeated game and Bayes’ Rule.
4. For each htC in which every qk ≤ 1/2, consumers’ beliefs about the type of
the firm are updated according to Bayes’ Rule and the firm’s strategy; oth-
erwise, τt+1 = 1 and consumers expect the firm to invest.
The definition states that consumers’ optimal strategy in the repeated game
maximises the sum of their current and future expected utility. However, the
specific regulatory rule I am studying implies that the firm is punished in the same
period in which complaints occur. Hence, if the consumers complaining strategy
is a function only of their beliefs (i.e., if consumers use Markov strategies), current
complaints do not affect the firm’s future behaviour. As rational consumers
anticipate this, E(qt+1;σt) = E(qt+1) and E(zˆt+1;σt) = E(zˆt+1). This results in
consumers behaving as if they were myopic: consumers complain only to punish
the firm’s current poor performance and so σ∗t (qt; zˆt) = σ
∗(qt; zˆt). This result is
presented in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. In any Markovian Equilibrium the consumers behave as if they were
myopic.
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Proof. Consider the firm’s optimal action in the last period. In period T its
optimal strategy is a cut off analogous to the one in the one-shot game: the firm
invests as long as ˆˆzT > ˆˆz
∗ and it does not invest if the inequality is reversed.
In equilibrium, ˆˆzT = zˆT , which depends on consumers’ beliefs about the firm’s
type (τT ) and investment strategy. τT is a function of past quality realisations
(through Bayesian updating) and consumers beliefs about the firm’s strategy
reflect common knowledge of the strategy profile. Therefore, the firm’s investment
in period T is determined by past realisations of quality but it is not affected
by the fact that the firm was fined in previous periods. A similar argument
explains why past fines (and hence past complaints) do not affect current or future
investment in periods before the last one. As consumers anticipate the firm’s
best response, they do not expect current complaints to affect future quality.
Consumers’ problem in the repeated game, maxσk Σ
T
k=tβ
k−1EU(σk; qk, zˆk) is then
equivalent to ΣTk=tβ
k−1 maxσk EU(σk; qk, zˆk) and so σ∗t (qt; zˆt) = σ∗(qt; zˆt).
The intuition behind this result is that, as the firm is punished in the same
period in which complaints occur, past fines (and hence past complaints) become
a sunk cost when the firm decides its current (and future) investment. Rational
consumers understand that future quality (and future firm’s behaviour) is not af-
fected by current complaints and so their complaining strategy is the myopic best
response to the quality realisation they received, given their prior expectations
-i.e., they complain in order to punish the firm’s current “poor performance”,
and not to affect its future behaviour. An important consequence of Lemma 2 is
that without the presence of the reference point in consumers’ utility function,
the optimal complaining strategy would be σ∗t = 0 for every t = 1, 2, ...T , because
not even utilitarian consumers would receive a positive payoff from complaining.
The formal implication of consumers’ myopic behaviour is that the repeated
game is strategically equivalent to a game in which a long-lived firm faces a se-
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quence of short-lived consumers, each of which plays only once but observes all
previous realisations of quality and complaints.
2.4.1 Equilibrium
The definition of informativeness of complaints I introduced in section 2.3 is
based on the existence of multiple equilibria, as it compares the (expected) pro-
portion of complaints in a low quality equilibrium with that in a high quality
equilibrium. Therefore, in this section I consider only the set of parameters for
which high and low quality equilibria coexist in the stage game and I study how
that set is affected by the repetition of the game. This means that I focus on
values of ˆˆz∗ ∈ [1/4, 1/2] and τ1 ≥ τ ∗ (see Proposition 1). Recall that ˆˆz∗ = hmp + ψ2
summarises the main parameters determining the strength of the punishment,
namely, the relative size of the fine and consumers’ cost of complaining. In a way
analogous to the one in section 2.3, I say that there is a high quality equilibrium
(HQE) when the firm invests in every period, and a low quality equilibrium (LQE)
when it does not invest in any period. Furthermore, as two periods are enough to
prove the main results, this section presents only the case in which T = 2. The
case in which T →∞ is presented in Appendix A.3.43 Proposition 2 summarises
the main result of the repeated game.
Proposition 2. Let τ ∗ be as defined in Proposition 1. Given ˆˆz∗ ∈ [1/4, 1/2], ψ <
1
4
and T = 2, there exist τ ∗∗ ≤ 1− 2ψ such that for every τ1 ∈ (τ ∗, τ ∗∗), the one
shot game has a high quality and a low quality equilibrium, but the repeated game
has only a low quality equilibrium. As a result, complaints are less informative
in the repeated game than in the one shot game.
43The infinite horizon game shows that the results of this Section do not depend upon the
existence of a final period.
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The proof of this proposition is divided in three parts. Lemmas 3 and 4 below
characterise the set of parameters for which a high and a low quality equilibria
exist in the two-period game, while Lemma 5 relates those results to the degree
of informativeness of complaints.
Lemma 3. Given ˆˆz∗ ∈ (1/4, 1/2) and T = 2, there exists an equilibrium in which
the firm invests in both periods for every τ1 > τ
∗∗, for some τ ∗∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Denote by s a strategy in which the firm invests in the first period and it
invest in the second period only if τ2 > τ
∗. The value for the firm from following
strategy s in the first period is:44
V s(τ1) = piH,1(zˆH,1(τ1), σ
∗) + β
[
1
2
piH,2(zˆH,2(1), σ
∗) +
+
1
2
[
Pr(τ2 > τ
∗)piH,2(zˆH,2(τ2), σ∗) + Pr(τ2 ≤ τ∗)piL,2(zˆL,2, σ∗)
]]
Under the equilibrium strategy, τ2 =
τ1
2−τ1 after q1 ≤ 1/2 and τ2 = 1 after q1 > 1/2.
For τ2 > τ
∗, the consumers expect the firm to invest in the second period and
so the level of quality they expect is either zˆH,2(1) or zˆH,2(τ2); for τ2 < τ
∗, their
expected quality is zˆL,2.
If the firm deviates in the first period, the realisation of quality is smaller
than 1/2 for sure; consumers do not detect the deviation, but the (low) quality
realisation induces them to reduce the probability they assign to the firm being
good and to lower their second period expectations accordingly. Hence, the value
of deviating in the first period but following strategy s in the second one is:
44From Lemma 2, the consumers’ complaining strategy is the same in every period. There-
fore, I denote it by σ∗ and not by σ∗t .
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V d(τ1) = piL,1(zˆH,1(τ1), σ
∗) + β
[
Pr(τ2 > τ
∗)piH,2(zˆH,2(τ2), σ∗) +
+ Pr(τ2 ≤ τ∗)piL,2(zˆL,2, σ∗)
]
By looking at the game backwards, it can be shown that for τ1 high enough
the investment strategy s, together with expected qualities zˆH,1(τ1), zˆH,2(τ2) for
τ2 > τ
∗ and zˆL,2 for τ2 ≤ τ ∗, constitute an equilibrium of the two-period game.
Consider the second period. As this is the last period of the game it is equivalent
to a one shot game with prior τ2 and so, from Proposition 1, the firm has no incen-
tives to deviate from s. The firm follows s in the first period if V s(τ1) ≥ V d(τ1).
The difference [V s(τ1) − V d(τ1)] is monotone, increasing and continuous in τ1,
V s(0) < V d(0) and V s(1) > V d(1). Then, there exists a unique prior belief τ¯
such that V s(τ¯) = V d(τ¯), and so for any τ1 ≥ τ¯ and t ∈ {1, 2} the firm has no
incentives to deviate from s.
The fact that the firm follows strategy s may or may not result in I2 = H. The
firm invests in the second period if and only if consumers expect so and τ2 > τ
∗.
This second condition holds for τ1 ≥ τ¯ = 2τ∗1+τ∗ . In this case, Pr(τ2 > τ ∗) = 1
and the firm invests in the first period too if τ1 ≥ τ¯ = 4ˆˆz∗ − 1 + β2 (1 − τ¯2−τ¯ ) =
τ ∗ + β
2
(1 − τ2).45 Then, there exists an equilibrium in which the firm invests in
both periods if and only if τ1 ≥ τ ∗∗ = max{τ¯ , τ¯}.46 Consumers’ expected qualities
in equilibrium are zˆ1 = zˆH,1(τ1) and zˆ2 = zˆH,2(1) if q1 > 1/2 and zˆ2 = zˆH,2(τ2) if
q1 ≤ 1/2.
45Substituting the firm’s expected profits,this expression becomes V s(τ1)− V d(τ1) = −h+
mp(zˆH,1(τ1)− ψ2 )− β2mp[zˆH,2(1)− zˆH,2(τ2)] > 0. As both zˆH,1(τ1) and zˆH,2(τ2) are increasing
in τ1, while zˆH,2(1) and zˆL,2 are independent of τ1, the difference is increasing in τ1.
46Note that while τ¯ > τ∗ and τ¯ ≥ τ∗, τ¯ ≷ τ¯ depending on how patient is the firm. In
particular, there exists βˆ such that when β > βˆ τ¯ > τ¯ while if β ≤ βˆ the opposite is true. To
see that this is the case, note that τ∗∗ = τ∗ < 2τ
∗
1+τ∗ if β = 0, τ
∗∗ is strictly increasing in β and
τ∗∗ > 2τ
∗
1+τ∗ > τ
∗ when β = 1.
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Lemma 4. Given ˆˆz∗ ∈ [1/4, 1/2] and T = 2, there exists an equilibrium in which
the firm does not invest in any of the two periods.
Proof. The second period is the last period of the game. From Proposition 1, if
consumers expected quality in the second period is zˆL, the firm’s best reply is
I2 = L as long as ˆˆz
∗ ≥ 1/4. On the equilibrium path, I1 = L and so a low quality
realisation in the first period is not informative about the firm’s type. Hence,
τ2 = τ1 and consumers expect low quality in the second period too.
Given ˆˆz∗ ≥ 1/4, the firm has no incentives to deviate either in the first or
in the second period. If the firm deviates in the first period (i.e., it invests
when consumers were expecting zˆL), that period’s (expected) profits are smaller
because the smaller fine does not compensate the higher cost of investment. The
(expected) second period profits do not increase with the deviation either. After
I1 = 1, there exists a positive probability that q1 ≤ 1/2. In this case, the
consumers do not detect the firm’s deviation and second period profits are not
affected by the deviation. There also exists a positive probability of a high quality
realisation that reveals the firm’s type. In this case, zˆ2,H(1) and the firm’s second
period profits are smaller under the deviation than under the equilibrium path.
Then, (I∗1 , I
∗
2 ) = (0, 0) together with zˆ1 = zˆ2 = zˆL and
ˆˆz∗ ∈ (1/4, 1/2) constitute
an equilibrium when ˆˆz∗ ≥ 1/4, and the Lemma is proved.
It can be further shown that the low quality equilibrium holds for a wider
set of parameters. In particular, it can be shown that the firm’s expected profits
under the deviation are smaller than under the equilibrium strategy as long as
ˆˆz∗ > 1
2(2+β)
.47
47The value for the firm of following the non-investment strategy is piL,1(zˆL,1, σ
∗)(1+β), and
the value of deviating in the first period is piH,1(zˆL,1, σ
∗) + β2 [piH,2(zˆH,2(1), σ
∗) +piL,2(zˆL,2, σ∗)].
The first expression is greater than the latter if and only if ˆˆz∗ > 12(2+β) . Thus, if the firm is
very impatient (β = 0), we are back in the one shot game and the LQE holds for ˆˆz∗ > 14 , but
if β → 1, the firm will not invest in any of the two periods as long as ˆˆz∗ > 16 . Therefore, the
region of parameters in which the firm does not invest is greater in the repeated game.
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Lemma 5. Customers complaints are less informative in the repeated game than
in the one shot game.
Proof. Lemmas 3 and 4 show that when T = 2 and ˆˆz∗ ∈ (1/4, 1/2), there exists
an equilibrium in which the firm does not invest in any of the two periods for
any τ1 ∈ (0, 1), but an equilibrium in which the firm invests in t = 1, 2 exists for
τ1 ≥ τ ∗∗. Proposition 1 shows that, for the same set of values of ˆˆz∗, the static
game also has a low quality equilibrium for any τ1, and a high quality equilibrium
for τ1 ≥ τ ∗. As long as τ1 < 1, τ ∗∗ > τ ∗ and so there exists a set τ1 ∈ (τ ∗, τ ∗∗),
for which the HQE exists in the one shot game but not in the repeated game.
τ ∗∗ − τ ∗ = β
2
(1 − τ2), which implies that the more patient is the firm and the
smaller is the initial τ1, the greater is the set of values of τ1 for which the repeti-
tion of the game eliminates the high quality equilibrium.
In the one shot game, complaints are informative if τ1 ∈ (τ ∗, 1 − 2ψ). As
shown in Lemma 1, the lower bound on τ1 is the minimum level at which the
firm is willing to invest, while the upper bound results from imposing the con-
dition that the (expected) proportion of complaints is higher in an equilibrium
in which the firm is not investing than in one in which I = 1. Imposing the
same condition to each period of the repeated game results in complaints being
informative about the firm’s investment only if τ1 ∈ (τ ∗∗, 1 − 2ψ). This guar-
antees that EqH (σ∗(q; zˆ1,H(τ1))) < EqL(σ∗(q; zˆL)) and that EqH (σ∗(q; zˆ2,H(τ2))) <
EqL(σ∗(q; zˆ2,L)).48 Therefore, the set (τ ∗, τ ∗∗) for which the equilibrium with high
quality ceases to exist in the repeated game contains values of τ1 for which com-
plaints would have been informative if T = 1. Hence, the repetition of the game
also reduces the degree of informativeness of complaints.
Lemma 5, together with Lemmas 3 and 4, shows that the set of τ1’s for which
the firm invests in equilibrium is reduced by the repetition of the game, which
48τ2 < τ1, so τ1 < 1− 2ψ implies τ2 < 1− 2ψ.
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in turn reduces the of informativeness of complaints. The intuition behind this
result is that when the firm invests it faces the risk that consumers find out its
type. When that happens in the last period (or when the game is played only
once) it does not affect the firm’s continuation value and so it optimally invests
if the reduction of the (expected) fine compensates the cost of investment. How-
ever, when consumers find out the type of the firm before the end of the game,
they increase the level of quality they expect to receive in the future, reducing
the firm’s future profits. The cost of reducing the current fine is higher in the
repeated game as it includes not only the cost of a higher (current) investment
but also the cost of smaller (expected) future profits. The change in the firm’s
expected profits due to higher consumers expectations is a decreasing function of
τ1 and so the firm’s incentives to keep consumers’ expectations low are higher for
smaller values of τ1. When τ1 is small, the inter temporal trade-off is more rele-
vant for its investment decision than the intra temporal trade-off and the firm’s
optimal action is to keep future expected quality low by not investing today. On
the contrary, when the probability consumers assign to the firm being of the good
type is very high, there is only a small scope to “manage” consumers expecta-
tions, what makes the intra temporal trade-off more relevant. In this case, the
firm’s profit maximisation strategy is to invest if consumers expect high quality
and not to invest if their expect so. The relevance of the inter temporal trade off
also depends on how patient is the firm: the higher β the more value the firm
assigns to future profits and the more it cares about keeping consumers expecta-
tions low.49
The appendix A.3 shows that, the same as in the finitely repeated game, when
T →∞, the existence of a high quality equilibrium depends on the scope of the
firm to manage consumers’ future expectation, which is positively related to β and
49In the case in which the game is repeated two periods, the lower bound of τ goes up from
4ˆˆz∗ − 1 to 4ˆˆz∗ − 1 + β2 (1− τ2).
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inversely related to τ1. Furthermore, as discussed in this section, the less scope
to manage consumers expectations the less informative are complaints about the
equilibrium being played (because the higher is the proportion of complaints in
a high quality equilibrium).
2.5 Conclusions
The model in this paper considers the role of customer complains as a regula-
tory tool in contexts in which quality is relatively well-perceived by the consumers,
but it is very costly for the regulator to observe it. In line with some empirical
evidence, it is assumed that consumers complain because they feel “disappointed”
with the level of quality they received and consider the firm should be punished
for its “poor performance”. The paper studies the firm’s incentives to invest and
the informativeness of customers complaints in such a context.
It is shown that complaints are informative when complaining is neither too
cheap nor too costly and when consumers assign a relatively low probability to
the firm being good. The presence of a rational reference point in consumer’s
complaining decision implies that “disappointment” and “poor performance” are
endogenously determined. As a result, the proportion of complaints may be
higher in a high quality equilibrium than in a low quality one if consumers believe
they are facing a good firm. Hence, the regulator may observe more complaints
when the firm is investing than when it is not and may punish the firm more
harshly in the first case. The paper further shows that the degree in which com-
plaints are informative is reduced by the repetition of the game. It is shown that
when the agency uses a regulatory rule as the one analysed in this paper, con-
sumers’ optimal behaviour in the repeated game is the myopic best response to
the quality they received, given they prior expectations. This behaviour creates
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the conditions for the firm to try to “keep expectations low” making complaints
less informative in the repeated game than in the one shot game. As a result, the
set of parameters for which complaints are informative about the firm’s behaviour
is reduced when the game is played repeatedly.
The results in this paper provide insights that may be useful in interpreting
consumers’ complaints (or other type of feedback) in a variety of settings. The
context considered here is one in which consumers receive no direct benefit out
of their complaints and thus their only reason to lodge a complaint is to transmit
their dissatisfaction. However, it is likely that in another settings consumers
do appropriate at least partially the benefit of their complaints. In this case,
complaints may be explained by a combination of reasons, one of which could
be dissapointment. Therefore, a note of care should be taken when interpreting
consumers’ complaints also in those settings.
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Chapter 3
Prices, Reviews and Endogenous
Information Transmission
3.1 Introduction
Online reviews of products, services or business are an increasingly important
source of consumers information about experience goods, i.e., goods whose qual-
ity is learned only after consumption. Recent empirical evidence suggests that
reviews are also becoming a more relevant determinant of the firm’s revenues,
either because of their impact in the quantity demanded or because consumers
are willing to pay a sort of “reputation premium” for products or services that
have good reviews.1
Closely related, though less documented, is the practice of offering important
online discounts and then ask the buyers to complete reviews.2 This practice
seems to be increasingly used by recently established (or recently refurbished)
1See, for example Luca (2011), Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006). As shown by Doyle and
Waterson (2012) and Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson, and Lockwood (2006), among others, the
effect of reviews on revenues also seems to be present in the case of online auctions.
2Price discounts are offered through a variety of web pages, like groupon.com or voucher-
codes.com, for example.
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small firms, like restaurants or pubs.3 It also seems to be an increasingly common
practice among restaurants or hotels in touristic areas. A common denominator
to both situations is that the firm does not have complete information about the
demand function it faces and so it values the information consumers can provide
it. At the same time, being experience goods provided by new small firms or
firms located far away from the consumer, it is unlikely that the consumer has
ex ante information about the value of the firm’s product or service.
Despite the growing importance of customers’ reviews, their role in the firm’s
pricing decisions has not been studied. This paper proposes a dynamic model
to investigate how prices and reviews affect each other. It considers a situation
in which a long lived firm faces a sequence of short lived consumers whose only
information about the value of the product is the one contained in the reviews
completed by previous consumers. As in the examples above, it is further assumed
that the firm does not know the actual value of the product either.4 After buying
the product, the consumer observes a quality realisation and decides which review
to complete (if any). The model assumes that consumers complete reviews in or-
der to maximise the joint expected utility of current and future (potential) buyers.
The results offer an explanation for those price discounts based on the value
of the information contained in the reviews. It is shown that the information gen-
erated by the reviews is valuable for both, the consumers and the monopoly. As
a result, the consumers and the firm “share” the cost of generating information.
It is further shown that consumers are willing to complete reviews only if it is
not too costly and the firm cannot appropriate all the surplus generated by the
3The list of business that resort to this type of practices is considerably long. Apart from
restaurants and pubs, it seems to be a common practice among recently established hairdressers,
beauty saloons and various entertainment-related firms.
4As a result, the model in this paper is closer to a screening model, in the sense that the firm
uses the price not to signal the quality of its product but to induce consumers to “transmit”
information to the firm about it.
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increased information. In this way, the incentives of the firm are “align” to those
of the second period consumers.
The existence of the reviews induces a mean preserving spread on the agents’
beliefs about the value of the good. As the posterior beliefs form a martingale
with respect to the reviews completed by previous consumers, reviews do not
affect the expected value of the posterior beliefs, but do increase their variability.
Combined with the convexity of the indirect utility and the profit functions, the
increased variability of the posterior beliefs results in the information contained
in the reviews being valuable for both, the consumers and the firm. Hence, both
parties are willing to face some cost in order to increase the information available
in the market.
The paper shows that, from the firm’s perspective, the cost of the information
contained in the reviews takes the form of a “discount” in the price offered to
current consumers. It is widely believed that the firm’s decision to offer price
discounts is due to an intention of “getting a good review”. The result in this
paper offers an alternative explanation. By reducing the current price, the firm
increases current (expected) demand which in turn increases the probability with
which the current consumer completes reviews. As this discount has the addi-
tional effect of compensating consumers for the cost of completing reviews, it also
induces a reviewing rule that is more favourable to the firm (in the sense that it
increases the expected future profits in the scenario with reviews).
From the perspective of the consumers, the price discount behaves as a “sub-
sidy” to the reviewing activity and thus it has an effect similar to a reduction in
the cost of completing reviews. It is further shown that the reviewing rule cho-
sen by consumers is “softer” the lower is the cost of completing reviews. In this
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paper, a reviewing rule is softer than another rule if the posterior belief resulting
from a bad review is higher and the one following a good review is lower. A softer
reviewing rule has a higher positive impact on the firm’s future profits because it
induces a mean preserving spread relative to a tougher rule. As a result, the firm
offers a higher price discount when it is easier for consumers to complete reviews
(and thus, when it is more interested in increasing the probability with which the
consumers complete reviews).
The paper shows that a necessary condition for the existence of reviews is
that the firm cannot extract all the surplus generated by the increased informa-
tion. Since the behaviour of the consumers and the firm changes according to the
observed reviews, the informational content of the reviews has a positive value
for both. As a result, the incentives of the firm are aligned with those of the con-
sumers in the sense that both prefer the existence of a reviewing system over a
situation with no information transmission. Consumers complete reviews in order
to increase the sum of current and future consumers’ expected utility. Hence, if
the firm could appropriate all the surplus consumers would not complete reviews:
completing reviews is a costly activity, then not even utilitarian consumers are
willing to complete reviews if by doing so they do not improve the utility of those
in their group (the consumers, in this case).
Before analysing the results in more detail, it is important to note that when
the consumer completes a review he is taking a costly action, the benefits of which
he cannot (fully) appropriate.5 Hence, the reviewing decision has some similari-
ties with an agent’s decision to contribute to the provision of a public good.6 The
5In a way analogous to the situations I study, empirical studies on eBay show that most of
the times the customer is not likely to buy again from the same seller, implying that he does not
receive a direct benefit from completing a review. Yet, Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) report
that 52.1% of the buyers on eBay actually provide voluntary feedback about their sellers.
6Since I make the simplifying assumption that there is a continuum of consumers, the model
in this paper suffers from an extreme version of free riding. Therefore, the standard result of
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free riding incentives in this context are analogous to the ones that originate the
“paradox of no voting”. Thus, to tackle this difficulty I borrow from the voting
literature and I assume that consumers are group-utilitarians, i.e., they receive
a positive payoff for acting according to a strategy that maximises consumers’
aggregate utility.
From a formal perspective, the utilitarian assumption implies that the game
is strategically equivalent to a two persons game, in which both players are long
lived. Therefore, the proposed reviewing game becomes analogous to a situation
of a bilateral monopoly, in which the firm is the only potential “buyer” of in-
formation and the group of consumers are the only potential “suppliers”. The
equilibrium results suggest that the cost of completing reviews allocates the sur-
plus created by that information between the firm and the consumers.
This paper is related with the large literature that studies how agents learn
from the actions of others. See for example Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch
(1992), Smith and Sorensen (2000) and Bose, Orosel, Ottaviani, and Vesterlund
(2006), Kremer, Mansour, and Perry (2012).7 In most part of that literature, the
transmission of information is an externality: agents’ actions carry information
about their private signals, and so other agents can learn from those actions.
The model in this paper adds to that literature because it endogenises consumers
decision to transmit information. Knowing that the previous consumer bought
is informative about his preferences over quality, but not about the actual value
of the good. However, after observing a realisation of quality, the consumer may
suboptimal provision obtained in public good games apply to the games analysed in this thesis
in a very extreme way, resulting in no complaints/reviews in equilibrium. See Osborne (2004).
7Kremer, Mansour, and Perry (2012) offer a normative analysis of a situation in which
agents may learn from the actions of others. They show that perfect information sharing
through internet does not always support an optimal outcome. This result is due to the fact
that information is a public good that is both produced and consumed by the same agents.
Then, a note of care should be taken when considering the agents’ incentives to explore and
produce new information.
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decide to complete a review, i.e., the consumer explicitly decides whether to trans-
mit information and which information to transmit (which review to complete).
This paper is also related to the literature on strategic information transmis-
sion and to the literature on public tests. When there is no cost of completing
reviews, the results in this paper are similar to that in Crawford and Sobel (1982),
in that the optimal set of messages is maximum because the preferences of the
“sender” (current consumers) and the “receiver” (future consumers) are aligned.
Furthermore, as the cost of completing reviews increases, the preferences become
less aligned. However, the reviewing model proposed in this paper differs from
the standard model of strategic transmission of information in that there is more
than one “receiver”, namely the second period consumers and the firm.
The model is also related to the literature on public tests.8 Gill and Sgroi
(2012) study a framework in which a firm can have its product publicly tested
before launch and tests vary in their toughness. They show that the firm always
prefers to have its product tested and that it will choose a test that is either
very tough or very soft. From the firm’s perspective, consumers’ reviews also
constitute a “public test” about its product, and I get a similar result to Gill and
Sgroi’s (2012) in the sense that the firm always prefer the existence of reviews.
However, the characteristics of the test in the model presented in this paper are
chosen by the consumers (and only indirectly affected by the firm).9 This allows
me to derive conclusions about the price the firm is willing to pay for tests with
different degrees of “toughness”.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the
8See Gill and Sgroi (2008, 2012) and Lerner and Tirole (2006).
9Comparing the results of the reviewing model of this paper and the public test model as
regards the toughness of the test is not as clear cut. However, the results suggest that in the
model presented here the firm’s preferred test is neither the softest possible nor the toughest.
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model, defines the reviewing rule and discusses its role on the public updating
of beliefs. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 develop the building blocks for the equilibrium
analysis of Section 3.5. Section 3.3 studies the optimal reviewing rule would in-
formation transmission be free, while Section 3.4 looks at how those result change
when there exists a positive cost of completing reviews. Section 3.6 concludes.
Appendix B.1 contains all the proofs that are not in the text.
3.2 Basic Setup
A risk-neutral monopolist sells a good of unknown value to a sequence of con-
sumers. The value of the good, v, can be high (H) or low (L), with H > L ≥ 0.
Nature selects v once and forever at the beginning of the game. Neither the firm
nor the consumers observe it, but they have a prior belief λ ∈ (0, 1) about the
good being high value.
There is a finite sequence of risk neutral buyers, each of which has a (poten-
tial) unit demand and lives for one period.10 Consumers’ preferences over quality
are random and change every period. Consumer t’s valuation of quality is γt,
where each γt is independently distributed U [0, 1], and it is independent of any
other random variable in the model. At the beginning of the period, the con-
sumer learns his valuation for quality, which is not observed by the firm. The
assumption that consumers are short lived implies that an individual consumer
cannot learn the value of the good from his personal experience. Furthermore,
the assumptions about γt together with the fact that the consumer has no private
information about the value of the good before buying, imply that his buying de-
cision contains no information about v either. As a result, the only information a
10Alternatively, it can be considered that every period there is a continuum of identical
consumers normalised to size one, who live during one period.
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consumer has about the value of the product before buying is the one contained
in the reviews completed by previous buyers.
As two periods are enough to present the main results, I consider only the
case with T = 2. The sequence of events is as follows. Given their prior beliefs
about v, a first generation of consumers choose the reviewing rule R that will
be followed if they buy the good. Then, the consumer observes γ1 and p1 and
decides whether to buy or not. If he buys, he observes a realisation of quality,
q1 ∈ [q0, qK ] ∈ R+. This quality realisation is distributed conditional on the
actual value of the good, q1 ∼ Fj(q) with j ∈ {L,H} and E(q;H) = H and
E(q;L) = L.11 It is further assumed that no quality realisation is fully reveal-
ing of the product’s value and that monotone likelihood ratio property holds, so
fH(q)/fL(q) is increasing in q.
At the beginning of the second period, a new generation of consumers observe
the reviews completed by previous buyers, their preferences over quality and the
price offered by the monopolist in the previous period. The previous buyer may
have completed a review i ∈ {G,N,B}; where G means he completed a “Good”
review, N means he did not complete a review (“remain silent”) and B that he
completed a “Bad” review. The consumer in period two uses this information
together with the knowledge of the reviewing rule used by the previous consumers
to update his beliefs about the probability of the good being high value (λ′).12
In any of the two periods, the consumer’s payoff from buying is γtqt−pt, while
his payoff from not buying is zero. Thus, he buys if and only if the expected pay-
11This assumption simplifies the notation and the algebra, but does not affect the results.
All that is needed for the results is that E(q;H) > E(q;L), which is implied by increasing
monotone likelihood ratio.
12As reviews are public, consumers’ beliefs about the value of the good are “public beliefs”.
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off from buying is positive: γtEλt(qt) ≥ pt.13 Without loss of generality, we can
assume H − L = 1, and so E(qt;λt) = λtH + (1 − λt)L = L + λt. Given λt and
the price, the consumer buys if γt ≥ ptλt+L .
From the firm’s perspective, P (γt ≥ ptλt+L) plays the role of the demand func-
tion: given γt, a higher price decreases expected demand, while a higher belief
about the good being of high value increases demand. The firm does not observe
γt but it knows the distribution from which it is drawn. Given consumer’s prior
belief and the price, expected profits in period t are:
pi(pt;λt) = (pt − c)P
(
γt ≥ pt
λt + L
)
= (pt − c)
(
λt + L− pt
λt + L
)
(3.1)
where c < L is the constant marginal cost of production.14
In what follows, I denote consumers’ prior and posterior beliefs after observ-
ing a review i by λ and λ′i, respectively.
3.2.1 Benchmark case: No Reviews
If there are no reviews, the possibility of transmitting information does not
exist and so there is no updating of beliefs and λ′ = λ. The firm’s optimal pricing
strategy consists in offering in every period the price that maximises static profits,
i.e., the price that solves:
Max
p
pi(p;λ) = (p− c)
(
λ+ L− p
λ+ L
)
13The weak inequality implies that if indifferent, the consumer buys.
14This assumption implies that the monopolist is willing to sell for every λt ∈ [0, 1]. If
c ∈ (L,H) the monopolist would prefer to stop selling for some λt > 0.
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which implies:
pˆ(λ) =
λ+ L+ c
2
(3.2)
Given λ, L and c, the maximum is unique because the profit function is strictly
concave with respect to the price.15 In this case, the firm’s maximum expected
profits in any period t are: pˆi(λ) = pi(pˆ;λ) = (λ+L−c)
2
4(λ+L)
.
The consumer buys the good if γtE(qt;λ) ≥ pt. Given λ and pˆ, the probability
that consumer t buys is the probability that γt ≥ pˆ(λ)λ+L , and his expected utility
is:
uˆ(λ) = u(λ, pˆ) (3.3)
= P
(
γt ≥ pˆ(λ)
λ+ L
)[
Eγ
(
γt|γt ≥ pˆ(λ)
λ+ L
)
(λ+ L)− pˆ(λ)
]
=
[λ+ L− c]2
8(λ+ L)
3.2.2 Reviews
The consumers complete reviews in order to maximise the sum of current and
future consumers’ net (expected) utility. Consumers are utilitarians, and so they
are willing to follow the social norm that maximises the group’s expected utility,
as long as it is not too costly.16 Consider a rule that determines two thresholds
of quality realisations, q¯(p1, λ) and q(p1, λ), such that if the first-period consumer
receives a quality draw greater than or equal to q¯(p1, λ) he completes a good
review, and if he receives q1 ≤ q(p1, λ) he completes a bad review. Finally, if he
receives a quality in between the thresholds, he completes no review. Denote by
R(p1, λ) = {q(p1, λ), q¯(p1, λ)} the reviewing rule followed by consumers in period
1. To simplify notation, I use q, q¯ and R as shorthand notation for q(p1, λ),
15 ∂2pi
∂p2 = − 2λ+L < 0.
16Feddersen and Sandroni (2006b).
64
q¯(p1, λ) and R(p1, λ), respectively.
The expected utility a period-t consumer derives from buying the good at
price pt, given λt, is u(λt, pt) = Eγ
(
γt|γt > ptλt+L
)
(λt + L)− pt. The total utility
of a first period consumer also depends on the cost of completing reviews and on
the impact of his buying and reviewing decisions on the expected utility of the
second-period consumer. Then, the utility of the first period consumer is:
U(R;λ, p1) = P
(
γ1 ≥ p1
λ+ L
)
[u(λ, p1)−Ψ(R;h, λ)] + (3.4)
+ P
(
γ1 ≥ p1
λ+ L
) ∑
i∈{B,N,G}
u(λ′i, p2(λ
′
i)) + (3.5)
+ P
(
γ1 <
p1
λ+ L
)
u(λ, p2(λ))
where Ψ(R;h, λ) is the expected cost of completing a review.17 The second line is
the expected utility of a period-2 consumer when the previous consumer bought
the good and completed review i ∈ {G,N,B} according to the rule R.18 The
last line is the expected utility when the previous consumer did not buy. In this
case, there is no updating of beliefs and λ′ = λ.
The existence of the review system induces a sequential game between the
firm and the consumers. Neither the firm nor the consumers know the actual
value of the product, but the firm chooses its price knowing the reviewing rule
consumers are going to follow. Consumers’ problem in the first period is to choose
the reviewing rule R that maximises the sum of current and future consumers’
expected utility, given their prior beliefs, their understanding of how future con-
17This cost function is studied in detail in Section 3.4, where I look deeply into the effects
of the costs of completed reviews on the optimal reviewing rule.
18λ′i is a shortcut for λ
′
i(λ;R)
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sumers will interpret the reviews and a proper anticipation of the firm’s pricing
strategy. The firm, on the other hand, behaves as a “Stackelberg follower”: given
the reviewing rule followed by consumers, it chooses the pricing strategy that
maximises the sum of current and future expected profits. Therefore, the price
offered by the firm in the first period is a best response to the consumers’ review-
ing rule. As a result, an equilibrium of the reviewing game is defined as a pair of
strategies {R∗, p∗1} such that, R∗ maximises (3.4) and p∗1 maximises the present
value of the firm’s profits, given R∗.
It is worth noting that at the moment in which the consumers and the firm
choose their actions (R and p1) they have no more information about the actual
value of the good than the one that is publicly available. Therefore, neither the
reviewing rule nor the price are informative about the probability of the good
being high value.
It becomes apparent from expression (3.4) that the price offered by the firm
in period one affects the probability that the current consumer buys the good
and, as a consequence, it affects the probability that current consumers transmit
information to future consumers (and to the firm itself) through the reviews. The
consumers’ reviewing rule determines not only what information is transmitted
(in the sense of which review is observed by the second-period consumer), but
also which inferences future consumers (and the firm) draw form the observed
reviews. Both elements affect future consumers’ willingness to pay for the good.
The problems of how much information is transmitted and which information
is transmitted induce different tradeoffs for the agents. Therefore, I analyse the
two problems separately before solving for the equilibrium strategies of the firm
and the consumers.
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The paper proceeds as follows. The remainder of this section analyses the
updating of beliefs after each possible review and the role of the rule in that
updating. The next section studies the impact of reviews in the firm’s profits
and the consumers’ utility without taking into account the costs of transmitting
information. Section 3.4 analyses how those results change when the cost of com-
pleting reviews is taken into account. Finally, section 3.5 studies the equilibrium
reviewing rule and pricing strategy.
3.2.3 Updating: Public Beliefs
At the beginning of the second period the consumers (and the firm) use the
reviews completed by past consumers to update their beliefs about the good be-
ing high value. The reviewing rule divides the space of quality realisations into
three intervals, determining which realisations induce which reviews. Therefore,
the reading the agents do into the reviews is a function of R.19
After observing a review, and given the history up to that point, the consumer
and the firm use Bayes’ Rule to update their beliefs about the good being high
value. This beliefs are “public” in the sense that they are entirely based on
public information. As a result, after observing a review i both, the firm and the
consumers assign the same probability to v = H. When observing a good review,
consumers know the realisation of quality received by the previous consumer was
higher than or equal to q¯. As a result, their updated belief is:
λ′G(λ;R) =
λ
∫ qK
q¯ fH(q)dq
λ
∫ qK
q¯ fH(q)dq + (1− λ)
∫ qK
q¯ fL(q)dq
(3.6)
19When the consumer in the second period updates his beliefs about the value of the good, γ1
and p1 are already known and so the reviewing rule can be considered as given when analysing
the posterior beliefs.
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Analogously, after observing a bad review the consumer knows that the pre-
vious consumer received a quality realisation equal to or below the threshold q;
his beliefs after a bad review are:
λ′B(λ;R) =
λ
∫ q
q0
fH(q)dq
λ
∫ q
q0
fH(q)dq + (1− λ)
∫ q
q0
fL(q)dq
(3.7)
Finally, if the first period consumer does not complete a review, it might be
because he did not buy the good or because he bought and received a quality
realisation within the no reviewing region. In the first case, the consumer in the
second period has nothing to learn from the absence of review, so λ′ = λ. In the
second case, the absence of review is informative about the quality realisation
being somewhere “in the middle”. The updating of beliefs in the latter case is:
λ′N (λ;R) =
λ
∫ q¯
q fH(q)dq
λ
∫ q¯
q fH(q)dq + (1− λ)
∫ q¯
q fL(q)dq
(3.8)
A good review increases the probability the agents assign to the good being
high value, and so it constitutes “good news” in the sense that λ′G ∈ (λ, 1).20
A bad review has the opposite effect: as it reflects a low quality realisation, it
reduces the agents beliefs; thus, a bad review is “bad news” and λ′B ∈ (0, λ).
Finally, when there are no reviews but the previous consumer bought the good,
beliefs about the good being high value may increase or decrease depending on
the conditional distributions of quality. However, λ′N is always higher than the
beliefs after observing a bad review, because it is an indication of a quality real-
isation above q, and it is always smaller than their beliefs after observing a good
20See Milgrom (1981).
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review. The next two claims summarise these effects.
Claim 1. Given R and λ ∈ (0, 1), good reviews are always good news about the
value of the good being high, while bad reviews are always bad news. No reviews
may be either good or bad news.
Claim 2. For every rule R, no reviews is better than a bad review but worst than
a good review: λ′G ≥ λ′N ≥ λ′B.
3.2.4 Role of the reviewing rule
The reviewing rule is chosen by consumers before deciding whether to buy the
good or not and so, it is chosen without having more information about the prod-
uct’s value than the one that is publicly available. As consumers are not better
informed than future consumers or the firm when choosing R, the reviewing rule
itself contains no information about v.
However, the rule does affect the beliefs of an agent that observes the reviews.
A higher q¯ means that it requires a higher quality realisation to get a good
review. As getting a good review is more difficult, consumers assign a higher
probability to the good being of high value the higher is q¯. Analogously, the
higher is q the more likely it is that the firm gets a bad review, so a bad review
is less damaging for higher values of q. The thresholds of the reviewing rule also
affect the inferences made after observing no reviews: observing that the previous
consumer completed no reviews (given that he bought the good) is better news
about the quality realisation he received the higher are q and q¯, because they
imply that the consumer remained silent for higher quality realisations. These
intuitions are summarised in Claim 3.
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Claim 3. For any λ ∈ (0, 1), λ′G is increasing in q¯, and λ′B is increasing in q.
Given that the previous consumer bought the good, the beliefs after observing that
he completed no reviews is an increasing function of both, q¯ and q.
3.3 Information Transmission
This section studies the effect of reviews on the expected payoffs of the firm
and the consumers when the costs of transmitting information are not taken into
account -i.e., when the cost of completing a review is zero and the price of the
first period is fixed. Isolating the effects of information transmission from its
costs is useful in that it highlights the strategic considerations that will shape the
equilibrium of the game.
Consider the last period of the game. The optimal reviewing rule has been
determined at the beginning of the previous period, and it is thus given by the
time the consumer observes a review. Furthermore, the consumer and the firm
know whether the previous consumer bought the good or not, so the analysis can
be conditional on the previous consumer having bought. After observing a review
i ∈ {G,N,B}, the firm’s optimal action is to offer the price that maximises its
static profits given the observed review, pˆ(λ′i), and hence the expected utility of
the second period consumer is uˆ(λ′i).
21 In this context, the problem faced by the
first period consumer is to choose the reviewing rule that maximises the expected
utility of the next consumer. Denote V (R;λ) = ∑i P (i;R, λ)uˆ(λ′i). Then, the
consumers’ problem is:
max
{q,q¯}
V (R;λ) (3.9)
21See Section 3.2.1.
70
A necessary condition for the existence of such a rule is that the information
transmitted through the reviews increases the expected utility of second period
consumers.22 Whether this is the case or not depends on the curvature of the
utility function because, as shown by the next claim, beliefs form a martingale.
Claim 4. For every reviewing rule R, and for every λ ∈ (0, 1), beliefs form a
martingale, i.e. E(λ′;λ,R) = λ.
Proof. Conditional on the previous consumer having bought the good:23,
E(λ′;λ,R) =
∑
i∈{G,N,B}
P (i;R, λ)λ′i
=
∑
i∈{G,N,B}
P (i;R, λt)
λ
∫
i fH(q)dq
P (i;R, λ)
= λ
[∫ qK
q¯t
fH(q)dq +
∫ q¯t
q
t
fH(q)dq +
∫ q
t
q0
fH(q)dq
]
= λ
The next Proposition shows that both the consumers and the firm prefer a
rule in which reviews are completed with positive probability.
Proposition 3. The information contained in the reviews increases the expected
payoff of both the firm and the consumers.
Proof. The consumers’ (expected) utility is a convex function of λ′; thus, by
Jensen inequality and the martingale property of the beliefs, it is higher when
there is some information transmission:
22Otherwise, consumers would receive no benefit from the reviews and so not even utilitarian
consumers would be willing to complete reviews.
23It is shown in the Appendix that the martingale property also holds if the expectation is
not conditional in the previous consumer having bought the good.
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Ei(u;R, λ) =
∑
i∈{G,N,B}
P (i;R, λ)uˆ(λ′i)
≥ uˆ( ∑
i∈{G,N,B}
P (i;R, λ)λ′i
)
= uˆ(λ)
where uˆ(λ) is the expected utility of a second period consumer when there there
is no updating of beliefs.
A similar analysis holds for the firm’s profits. Given that the previous con-
sumer bought the good, the firm’s expected profits when consumers can submit
reviews are:
Ei(pi;R, λ) =
∑
i∈{G,N,B}
P (i;R, λ)pˆi(λ′i)
Since the profit function is convex, the martingale property of the beliefs and
Jensen’s inequality imply:24
Ei(pi;R, λ) =
∑
i∈{G,N,B}
P (i;R, λ)pˆi(λ′i)
≥ pˆi( ∑
i∈{G,N,B}
P (i;R, λ)λ′i
)
= pˆi(λ)
Proposition 3 shows that, when its costs are not considered, the possibility
of transmitting information through the reviews increases the (expected) payoff
of both the consumers and the firm. The reviews completed by the consumers
24Convexity of the expected profits is shown in Appendix B.1.
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are a function of the quality realisations they observed, which in turn are corre-
lated with the actual v. Therefore, the reviews are informative about the value
of the good. The informativeness of the reviews increases expected profits and
utility because it allows the firm and the consumers to adjust the price and the
willingness to pay to a better approximation of v. It is important to note that
this “alignment” of the incentives of the firm and the consumers holds because
the monopolist cannot fully appropriate the additional surplus generated by the
transmission of information. In the context of this paper, if the firm could appro-
priate all the surplus, leaving second period consumers indifferent between buying
and not buying for every observed review, second period consumers’ would be in-
different between receiving or not the information contained in the reviews. As
a result, first period consumers would be indifferent between completing reviews
or not when it is costless, but they would not complete reviews when there is a
positive cost of doing it.
In order to determine the existence of an optimal reviewing rule that first
period consumers are willing to follow, it is useful to look at the optimal amount
of messages they would chose to use when completing reviews is free.25 The next
Lemma shows that, when the first consumer buys the good, the expected utility
of second period consumers is maximised by using all the available messages.26
Proposition 4 uses the result in the Lemma to show the existence of a reviewing
rule that maximises the expected utility of second period consumers.
Lemma 6. Assume that there is no cost of transmitting information. If there
25When there is no cost of completing a review, the three available messages (G, N and B)
have the same unit cost and, given that the previous consumer bought, the three are informative
about v.
26The implication of the Lemma is that, if we consider a system with M available messages
and the cost of completing any two messages is the same, consumers will always choose a
reviewing rule that assigns positive probability to all the M messages as this increases the
precision of the information received by second period consumers. As discuss later in this
section, this result is similar to the one in Crawford and Sobel (1982), and it is related to the
fact that the preferences of the “sender” and the “receiver” are aligned.
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exists an optimal reviewing rule that consumers are willing to follow, then it
assigns positive probability to all the available messages.
The proof of the Lemma is in Appendix B.1. It shows that the addition of a
third message induces a mean preserving spread with respect to the case in which
there are only two messages. Given that the utility function is convex in the prior,
this means that consumers always prefer using three messages instead of two. The
introduction of a third message induces a finer partition of the set of quality re-
alisations. As a result, the level of information received by the consumers in the
second period is higher and so they can adjust their behaviour to a better ap-
proximation of the actual v. The firm’s expected profits are convex in the belief
too; hence, its payoff is also higher when consumers use all the available messages.
When there are no costs of completing reviews, the preferences of first and
second period consumers are perfectly aligned. Therefore, the result in Lemma
6 is analogous to the one in Crawford and Sobel (1982). They show that the
more similar are the preferences of the sender and the receiver, the larger is the
maximal number of reports in equilibrium. The model in this paper differs from
the standard model of strategic information transmission in that it has two “re-
ceivers” of the information, the future consumers and the firm. It is worth noting,
however, that the firm is only an “indirect” receiver, because consumers aim when
completing reviews is to transmit information to future consumers. The price of-
fered by the firm in the first period may affect consumers’ choice of the optimal
amount of messages. I explore this possibility in Section 3.5.1.
An immediate implication of Lemma 6, is that there exists a rule, charac-
terised by q¯ < qK , q > q0 and q¯ > q that maximises the expected payoff of
second-period consumers.
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Proposition 4. Expected second period utility is maximised for some rule Ru =
{qu, q¯u} such that qu ∈ (0, q¯u) and q¯u ∈ (qu, qK).
Proof. The Proposition results from the fact that the rule maximises a continuous
function over a non-empty and compact set. The fact that the consumers prefer
a rule that uses three messages over a rule that uses only two means that their
expected utility increases as q moves away from q0 and q¯ moves away from qK .
Furthermore, as shown in the next Lemma, this rule also maximises the firm’s
expected profits. As a result, the existence of the reviews aligns the incentives of
the firm and the consumers.
Lemma 7. The reviewing rule that maximises second period consumers’ expected
utility, Ru, also maximises the firm’s expected second period profits.
Proof. After observing a review i ∈ {G,N,B} the firm optimally sets the sec-
ond period price at pˆ2(λ
′
i). At this price, the expected utility of a second pe-
riod consumer is uˆ2(λ
′
i) =
(λ′i+L−c)2
8(λ′i+L)
and the firm’s (maximum) expected profit is
pˆi2(λ
′
i) =
(λ′i+L−c)2
4(λ′i+L)
. As defined before, V (R;λ) = ∑i∈{G,N,B} P (i;R)uˆ2(λ′i) and
so Ei(pi2;R, λ) = 2V (R;λ). Then, if {qu, q¯u} maximises V (·), it also maximises
Ei(pi2;R, λ).
The more accurate the information the firm has about the value of v, the
better it can adjust its second period price and thus, the higher are its expected
second period profits. At the beginning of the second period both the firm and
the consumers have the same information about value of the good. Hence, a
rule that maximises the information available to second period consumers also
maximises the one available to the firm.
75
Corollary 1. The existence of information transmission through reviews aligns
the incentives of the consumers and the firm.
3.4 Cost of completing a review
The previous section showed that there exists a reviewing rule Ru = {qu, q¯u}
that consumers are willing to follow when completing reviews is costless and the
first period price is given. When the cost of completing a review is taken into
account, the three messages available to the consumers (G, N and B) are not
equivalent anymore. Conditional on the previous consumer having bought the
good, the three available messages are informative about the quality realisation
observed by the previous consumer, but while a good or a bad review have a
positive cost, not completing a review is costless. When the firm’s response in
terms of first period price is not considered, the rule is not affected by (and does
not affect) the probability that the first consumer buys. This section considers
the effect of the cost of completing reviews when the first consumer bought the
good. The main result is that, as long as the unit cost of completing a review
is not very high, a rule that uses the three available messages is still optimal,
but the set of quality realisations for which consumers do not complete reviews
increases with the cost.
The cost of completing one review is h > 0; the total expected cost given
a reviewing rule R is h times the probability of completing either a good or a
bad review. Then, the total expected cost, Ψ(R;h, λ), is given by the following
expression:
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Ψ(R;h, λ) = h [P (B;R, λ) + P (G;R, λ)] (3.10)
= h
[
λ
(∫ q
q0
fH(q)dq +
∫ qK
q¯
fH(q)dq
)
+ (1− λ)
(∫ q
q0
fL(q)dq +
∫ qK
q¯
fL(q)dq
)]
The first two terms in the second line define the probability of completing a
good or a bad review conditional on the true value being H, while the last two
terms measure the expected cost of completing a review conditional on the true
value of the good being L. Consumers face the cost of completing a review only
if they buy the good.
The expected cost of completing a review is an increasing function of h and q,
and a decreasing function of q¯. A higher value of q¯ reduces the probability that
the consumer completes a good review and so it reduces the expected cost:
∂Ψ(R;h, λ)
∂q¯
= h
∂P (G;R, λ)
∂q¯
= −h[λfH(q¯) + (1− λ)fL(q¯)] < 0 (3.11)
Analogously, a higher q increases the probability of getting a quality realisation
low enough so as to complete a bad review, which increases the expected cost:
∂Ψ(R;h, λ)
∂q
= h
∂P (B;R, λ)
∂q
= h[λfH(q) + (1− λ)fL(q)] > 0 (3.12)
When completing reviews is costless, first period consumers would be indiffer-
ent between any two rules that induce the same expected utility for the consumers
in the second period. This is not true anymore when the cost the of completing
reviews is taken into account: would there exist two rules that deliver the same
value of V (·), first period consumers would now prefer the one that induces the
smaller probability of completing either a good or a bad review. As a result, the
optimal rule when completing reviews is not free makes a more extensive use of
the “cheap message”, N .
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Proposition 5. When there exists a positive cost h of completing a review, there
exists an optimal rule Rc = {qc, q¯c} such that qc < qu and q¯c > q¯u.
Proof. From Proposition 6, there exists a reviewing rule Ru = {qu, q¯u} that
maximises consumers’ (expected) payoff when completing a review is costless.
Now, consider how those thresholds change when the cost of completing reviews,
Ψ(R;h, λ), is taken into account. Given p1, the reviewing rule R affects the ex-
pected utility of the first period consumer through the cost of completing reviews
and through its impact on future consumers’ expected utility. The consumer’s
problem in this case is:
max
{q,q¯}
V (R;λ)−Ψ(R;h, λ)
Taken derivatives with respect to q¯ and q, the first order conditions are:
∂V (R;λ)
∂q¯
− ∂Ψ(R;h, λ)
∂q¯
= 0 (3.13)
∂V (R;λ)
∂q
− ∂Ψ(R;h, λ)
∂q
= 0 (3.14)
WhenR = Ru = {qu, q¯u}, the expression in (3.13) is positive because
∂V (Ru;λ)
∂q¯
=
0 as Ru maximises the second period’s expected utility, but the derivative of Ψ(·)
with respect to q¯ is negative for every q¯ ∈ [q0, qK ]. Therefore, when the cost of
completing reviews is considered, the optimal cut-off quality for good reviews, q¯c,
must be higher than q¯u. Analogously, the optimal cut-off quality for bad reviews,
qc, is below q
u
when the cost of completing reviews is taken into account. In this
case, (3.14) evaluated at {q, q¯} = {q
u
, q¯u} is negative: ∂V (Ru;λ)∂q = 0 and the cost
of completing reviews is an increasing function of q. As a result, qc < q
u
.
When completing a review is costly, consumers face a trade off because trans-
mitting more accurate information increases future consumers’ expected payoff,
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but it reduces the payoff of current consumers. As the intermediate message is
informative but costless, they solve the trade off by making a more extensive use
of this “free message”. As a result, q¯c− qc > q¯u− qu. The reviewing rule used by
consumers when h is positive may be considered “more tough” than Ru. When
consumers rely more extensively on the cheapest message (N), the set of qual-
ity realisations after which the first consumer completes a good review becomes
smaller and so does the set after which he completes a bad review. As extreme
reviews become less likely, the updating they induce becomes more extreme: a
good review constitutes better news (has a higher positive impact on beliefs and
profits) and a bad review is more damaging in the sense that it induces a higher
reduction of the beliefs -i.e., λ′B(λ;Rc) < λ′B(λ;Ru) and λ′G(λ;Rc) > λ′G(λ;Ru).27
Whether it is still optimal for consumers to use the three available messages
depends on the unit cost of completing reviews, h. As shown above, when the
cost of completing a review, h is taken into account, the thresholds in consumers’
optimal reviewing rule become closer to the extremes. However, more accurate
information is still better for second period consumers. Therefore, as shown in
Lemma 8, as long as h is not very high, consumers still prefer a rule such that
q¯c < qK and qc > q0.
Lemma 8. There exists h(λ, q¯c) and h¯(λ, q
c
) such that for every λ ∈ (0, 1) and
for every h < min{h(λ, q¯c), h¯(λ, q
c
)}, the optimal reviewing rule implies qc > q0
and q¯c < qK.28
27The distribution of posterior beliefs induced by the rule Rc dominates stochastically of
second order the one induced by Ru. As both distributions have the same mean (by the
martingale property of the beliefs) this means that the distribution induced by Ru is a mean
preserving spread of the one induced byRc. Combined with the convexity of the utility function
with respect to the beliefs, this implies that V (Rc, λ) < V (Ru, λ).
28A formal proof of this result in Appendix B.1.
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3.5 Equilibrium: Reviews and Price Discounts
This section solves for the equilibrium reviewing rule and price when T = 2.
Given that neither the firm nor the consumers know the actual value of v, the
equilibrium concept is similar to a subgame perfect equilibrium. The consumers
move first and so their strategy is a reviewing rule R. The firm chooses the first
period price after consumers have chosen the rule and thus, its strategy assigns
a price to every possible reviewing rule chosen by the consumers. The game is
solved backwards: subsection 3.5.1 looks at the optimal first period price and
subsection 3.5.2 presents the optimal reviewing rule and the equilibrium of the
game, using the results from previous sections as building blocks.
3.5.1 Firm’s pricing strategy
The firm’s strategy in the two-period game consists of a first period price
that maximises the sum of current and future profits, given a reviewing rule R
and its own optimal pricing behaviour in the last period.29 In the second period
the firm will charge the optimal static price, given the public beliefs about the
value of v -i.e., p∗2 = pˆ2(λ
′
i) if the first period consumer bought the good and
completed review i, and p∗2 = pˆ2(λ) if he did not buy. From Proposition 3, the
information generated by the reviews increases the monopolist’s expected second
period profits. Therefore, the firm has incentives to reduce the first period price
if by doing so it increases the probability that the first period consumer buys the
good and completes reviews. As a price discount reduces first period’s profits,
the firm faces a standard trade off between current and future profits. The firm’s
29The same is true when T > 2. I look at the two periods case because it is enough to derive
the main intuitions.
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optimisation problem, given a reviewing rule R is:30
max
p1
Π(p1;λ,R) = pi1(p1;λ)+P (γ1 ≥ p1
λ+ L
)Ei(pˆi2(λ′i))+P (γ1 <
p1
λ+ L
)pˆi2(λ) (3.15)
The first term is the first period expected profit, pi1(p1;λ) = P (γ1 ≥ p1λ+L)(p− c).
The second term is the expected second period profit if the first consumer buys
the good and so there is some transmission of information between periods -
pˆi2(λ
′
i) = pi2(pˆ2;λ
′
i). The last term is the firm’s expected second period profit
when the first period consumer does not buy (and so λ′ = λ). From Proposition
3, Ei(pˆi2(λ′i)) ≥ pˆi2(λ). This maximisation problem results in an optimal first
period price:
p∗1(R;λ) =
λ+ L+ c− [Ei(pˆi2(λ′i))− pˆi2(λ)]
2
(3.16)
= pˆ1(λ)− [Ei(pˆi2(λ
′
i))− pˆi2(λ)]
2
which is smaller than the static optimal price by an amount that depends on the
increase in the (expected) future profits induced by the reviews.31 Denote the
first period profits induced by price p∗1(R;λ) by pi∗1(λ;R).
The price function in (3.16) is the firm’s best reply to consumers’ reviewing
rule. The difference in expected second period profits, [Ei(pˆi2(λ′i))− pˆi2(λ)], is the
value for the firm of the information contained in the reviews. The firm is no
better informed than consumers are about v and so the price it chooses in the
first period is not a signal about the actual value of the good. From the firm’s
perspective, the role of (pˆ1 − p∗1) is to assign probabilities between two possible
states of the world: one in which the first period consumer buys the good, and so
30Recall that λ′i is a shortcut for λ
′
i(λ;R).
31The firm’s maximisation problem considers the case in which the monopolist’s discount
factor is equal to one. Considering a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) would result in a first period
price closer to the static optimal price but would not change the main intuitions.
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he completes reviews, and another state in which the first period consumer does
not buy (and so λ′ = λ). The firm’s expected profits are higher in the first case,
but increasing the probability of that state requires a reduction of p1 that reduces
(expected) first period profits. Therefore, [pˆi1(λ) − pi∗1(λ;R)] > 0 constitutes a
measure of the “price” paid by the firm in order to get information about v.32 It
is apparent from expression (3.16) that the price discount the firm is willing to
offer depends on the benefit it expects to receive from the information contained
in the reviews, which in turns depends on the rule chosen by consumers (R).
3.5.2 Optimal Reviewing Rule and Equilibrium
The consumers’ problem is to choose a reviewing rule that, given a proper
anticipation of the firm’s pricing strategy, maximises the sum of the utilities of
first and second periods’ consumers. Therefore, their strategy is a mapping from
their prior beliefs (λ) and cost of completing reviews (h) into a pair of thresholds
{q, q¯} ∈ [q0, qK ]2. Their maximisation problem is as follows:
max
{q,q¯}
P
(
γ1 ≥ p1(R;λ)
λ+ L
)[
u1(p1;λ)−Ψ(R;h, λ) + Ei(uˆ2(λ′i))
]
+P
(
γ1 <
p1(R;λ)
λ+ L
)
uˆ2(λ)
(3.17)
where p1(R;λ) is the price function in (3.16). The expression above shows that
the reviewing rule chosen by the consumers affects, through its effect on p1, the
probability that the first period consumers buys and, if he buys, his expected
utility. The rule also affects the expected utility of the second period consumer
because the reading the consumers do into the reviews affects their valuation for
the good, which in turn determines the equilibrium values of p2(·) and u2(·).
32It can also be considered as the price paid by the firm in order to have its product “tested”
by consumers.
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From the consumers’ perspective, the smaller first period price compensates
part of the cost of completing reviews and so they optimally move the reviewing
rule closer to the one that maximises V (·).33 As shown in Lemma 7, such a rule
also increases the firm’s expected second period profits, which compensates the
profits lost because of the discount. These intuitions are formalised in the follow-
ing Equilibrium Proposition.
Proposition 6. Equilibrium. Given λ ∈ (0, 1) and h < min{h, h¯}, there exists a
reviewing rule R∗ = {q∗, q¯∗} and a first period price p∗1(R∗, λ) < pˆ1(λ), such that
R∗ is the consumers’ best response to p∗1(R∗, λ) and p∗1(R∗, λ) is the best reply
of the firm to R∗(·). Furthermore, the equilibrium reviewing rule is such that
q∗ ∈ (qc, q
u
] and q¯∗ ∈ [q¯u, q¯c).
Proof. The conditions about λ and h guarantee that the consumers’ problem has
an interior solution. The result in the Proposition can be proved by contradic-
tion. Considered the graph in Figure 3.1. The figure presents the thresholds of
the rules Rc and Ru; as shown in Proposition 5, q¯c > q¯u and qc < qu. Consider
a rule such that R in the Figure. This rule’s thresholds are q¯ < q¯u and q > qu
(i.e., it is a “softer” rule than Ru). Starting from rule Ru, moving the thresholds
according to the rule R reduces the expected utility of second period consumers,
V (·). Furthermore, as this rule implies a higher probability of both, good and bad
reviews relative to Ru and Rc, it also increases the cost of completing reviews. As
a result, V (R, λ)−Ψ(R;h, λ) < V (Ru, λ)−Ψ(Ru;h, λ) < V (Rc, λ)−Ψ(Rc;h, λ).
R would also imply a smaller expected utility for first period consumers: from
Lemma 7, E(pi2; pˆ2(λ′i)) is maximised when the reviewing rule is Ru. Then, for
any other rule the firm offers a smaller price discount, which reduces the expected
utility of first period consumers. Then, starting from Ru consumers have no in-
33As discussed below, the fact that the price discount has a similar effect (from consumers’
point of view) to a reduction in h does not mean that reducing p1 and reducing h are substitutes
from the firm’s perspective.
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Figure 3.1: Reviewing Rule
qc qu 
q0 qK 
qu qc 
  R’’   R   R’ 
centives to move to a “softer” rule like R.
On the other hand, consider a rule likeR′ in the figure, with q′ < q
c
and q¯′ = q¯c
. Recall that Rc maximises the expected utility of second period consumers net
of the cost of completing reviews. Therefore, V (R′, λ)−Ψ(R′;h, λ) < V (Rc, λ)−
Ψ(Rc;h, λ). Starting from Rc, this new rule reduces the firm’s expected second
period profits when there are reviews, and thus it implies a smaller discount in
the price of the first period. Therefore, the expected utility of first and second
period consumers is smaller with a rule like R′ than with Rc and so consumers
have no incentives to move to a rule tougher than Rc. A similar analysis applies
in the case of a rule like R′′, for which q′ = q
c
but q¯′ ≥ q¯c. Thus, consumers best
response to the firm’s pricing strategy must be a rule R∗ such that q∗ ∈ (qc, q
u
]
and q¯∗ ∈ [q¯u, q¯c) -i.e., a rule whose thresholds lie within the dotted part of the
quality line of Figure 3.1.
Proposition 4 showed that there exists a reviewing rule Ru that maximises
consumers expected second period utility when the cost of completing reviews is
not taken into account. The firm’s expected profits in the second period with
reviews are also maximised by that rule. However, when consumers take into
account the cost of competing reviews they move to a rule that induces smaller
probabilities of completing good and bad reviews. As a result, a bad review has
a more damaging impact on the firm’s profits and a good review has a higher
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impact on the posterior (though it has a smaller probability). The firm is willing
to pay a higher “price” for the first rule than for the second one and, as the price
discount “subsidises” part of the cost of completing reviews, it induces first pe-
riod consumers to choose a reviewing rule that is closer to the one that increases
the expected payoff of both, the firm and the second period consumers.
Discussion
Role of h. The discount the firm is willing to offer to first period consumers
increases as h decreases. The smaller is the cost of completing reviews the closer
is the rule chosen by consumers to the one preferred by the firm (Ru). As shown
before, this implies that, the value of the information contained in the reviews
increases and so the firm’s best response it to reduce p1 in order to increase
the probability that the first consumer buys. In the limit in which h = 0, the
price discount (pˆ1 − p∗1) is maximum. This result implies that, contrary to some
widespread beliefs, the price discount is not a substitute of a smaller cost of
completing reviews, but it is instead its complement. It also suggests that as h
decreases the burden of the “cost” of transmitting information moves from the
consumers towards the firm. It is worth noting that a smaller h increases the
expected payoff of both, the consumers and the firm.
A Bilateral Monopoly. The equilibrium results presented above can be easily
associated with a situation of bilateral monopoly. If current and future consumers
are considered as a “group”, they may be regarded as the only “suppliers” of
the information contained in the reviews while the firm is the unique potential
“buyer”. The firm pays the consumers for the information in the reviews by re-
ducing the first period price. Furthermore, the “price” the firm is willing to pay is
higher the higher is the positive impact of the reviews on the firm’s future profits.
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Hence, the cost of completing reviews is one of the elements that allocates the
surplus between the two sides of the market. As h decreases, the reviewing rule
“offered” by the consumers gets closer to the one preferred by the firm, and so
the firm is willing to pay a higher price.
3.6 Conclusions and Further Research
This paper proposes a dynamic game to explain how the reviews completed
by consumers about the quality of an experience good and the pricing strategy
of a monopoly firm affects each other. The results suggest that information is
valuable for both, the firm and the consumers and so they are willing to “share”
the costs of generating that information.
An important result of the paper is that a necessary condition for the exis-
tence of reviews in equilibrium is that the firm cannot appropriate all the surplus
generated by the information in the reviews. As a consequence, second period
consumers are not indifferent between observing the reviews or not and so first
period consumers are willing to complete reviews (and the firm is willing to “pay”
for them).
It is worth noting that the linearity of the demand function used in the model
does not allow for the possibility that second period consumers do not get part
of the surplus. However, the results may be affected by a change in the demand
function. Under the assumptions made in this paper, would the firm be able to
leave second period consumers indifferent between buy and not buying for every
observed review, first period consumers would have less (or none) incentives to
complete reviews. The firm would like to reduce the price of the second period,
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but it would face a commitment problem: in any finite game, after a review is
observed the firm would have incentives to extract all the surplus. Solving back-
wards, consumers would not complete reviews if they complete reviews in order
to increase the expected utility of future consumers.
The implications of this possibility are matter of future research. One possible
explanation is that the reason we observe reviews is not related with consumers’
intentions to maximise current and future consumers’ (expected) payoff, as was
assumed in this paper. Therefore, the implications of alternative assumptions
about why consumers complete reviews (like anger, punishment or reciprocity,
for example) should be considered.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Expected Proportion of Complaints
The expected proportion of complaints depends on the realisation of qual-
ity, which depends on the firm’s type and investment. Taking expectations of
the consumers’ optimal complaining rule with respect to the quality distribution
induced by investment I, the expected proportion of complaints is:
EqI (σ
∗(q; zˆ)) = [PqI (σ
∗(q; zˆ) = 1) ∗ 1 +
+ PqI (σ
∗(q; zˆ) =
θ
c
(zˆ − q))EqI (σ∗(q; zˆ)|σ∗(q; zˆ) ∈ (δ¯, 1)) +
+ PqI (σ
∗(q; zˆ) = δ¯) ∗ δ¯]
Using consumer’ optimal strategy in (2.3), the expectation can be rewritten
in terms of the realised level of quality:
EqI(σ∗(q; zˆ)) = [PqI (q ≤ zˆ −
c
θ
) +
+ PqI (zˆ −
c
θ
≤ q ≤ zˆ − δ¯c
θ
) ∗
∗ EqI [σ∗t (q; zˆ)|zˆ −
c
θ
≤ q ≤ zˆt − δ¯c
θ
] +
+ PqI (zˆ −
δ¯c
θ
≤ q ≤ zˆ − δ¯c
2θ
) ∗ δ¯] (A.1)
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where:
EqI [σ
∗(q; zˆ)|zˆ − c
θ
≤ q ≤ zˆt − δ¯c
θ
] =
θ
c
(zˆ − EqI [q|zˆ −
c
θ
≤ q ≤ zˆ − δ¯c
θ
])
EqI [q|zˆ −
c
θ
≤ q ≤ zˆ − δ¯c
θ
] =
1
PqI (zˆ − cθ ≤ q ≤ zˆ − δ¯cθ )
zˆ− δ¯c
θw
zˆ− c
θ
xf(x)dx
The expected proportion of complaints is then a function of the distribution
of quality, which in turns depend on the type and investment decision of the firm.
Denote ψ = c
θ
. For a good firm which invests q ∼ U [0, 1]. The probabilities in
the above expressions, become:
PI=H(q ≤ zˆ − ψ) = zˆ − ψ
PqH (zˆ − ψ ≤ q ≤ zˆ − δ¯ψ) = ψ(1− δ¯)
PqH (zˆ − δ¯ψ ≤ q ≤ zˆ −
δ¯ψ
2
) =
δ¯ψ
2
EqH (q|zˆ − ψ < q < zˆ − δ¯ψ) = zˆ −
c
2θ
(1 + δ¯)
EqH [σ
∗(q; zˆt)|zˆ − ψ ≤ q ≤ zˆ − δ¯ψ] = 1 + δ¯
2
All the above probabilities are equal than or greater than zero if τ > 4ψ − 1.
Substituting these results in (A.1), the expected proportion of complaints when
the good type of the firm invests becomes EqH (σ∗(q; zˆ)) = zˆ − ψ2 .
When the good type of the firm does not invest, or when the firm is bad,
q ∼ U(0, 1/2). The above probabilities in this case are:
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PqL(q ≤ zˆ − ψ) = 2(zˆ − ψ)
PqL(zˆ − ψ ≤ q ≤ zˆ − δ¯ψ) = 2ψ(1− δ¯)
PqL(zˆ − δ¯ψ ≤ q ≤ zˆ −
δ¯ψ
2
) = δ¯ψ
EqL(q|zˆ − ψ ≤ q ≤ zˆ − δ¯ψ) = zˆ −
ψ
2
(1 + δ¯)
EqL [σ
∗(q; zˆ)|zˆ − ψ ≤ q ≤ zˆ − δ¯ψ] = 1 + δ¯
2
The expected proportion of complaints when a good firm does not invest or
when the firm is of the bad type is EqL(σ∗(q; zˆ)) = 2zˆ − ψ.
ψ = c
θ
≥ 1
4
, guarantees that all the above probabilities are greater than zero.
Then, the condition in Propositions 1 and 2 is sufficient but not necessary.
A.2 Bayesian Updating
When consumers expect the good type of the firm to invest, a low realisation of
quality increases the evidence in favour of the firm being bad. Bayesian updating
implies:
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τ1 = P (G|q1 < 1
2
) =
P (q1 <
1
2 |G)P (G)
P (q1 <
1
2 |G)P (G) + P (q1 < 12 |B)P (B)
=
τ
2
τ
2 − (1− τ)
=
τ
2− τ (A.2)
If consumers do not expect the good type of the firm to invest, a low reali-
sation of quality does not give them any additional information about the firm’s
type and so there is no updating of beliefs.
In both cases, a high (expected or unexpected) realisation of quality is fully
revealing of the firm type, and implies τ1 = 1.
A.3 Equilibria of the Repeated Game when T →
∞
This Appendix studies how the results of Section 2.4 extend to the case in
which the number of periods goes to infinity. It is shown that, even when T →∞,
a regulation based on customers complaints induces an equilibrium with positive
probability of investment as long as the firm is not extremely patient, consumers’
prior about the firm being good is relatively high and the punishment is harsh
enough. The informativeness of customers complaints is also analysed. The main
results of the Appendix are summarised in the following Proposition:
Proposition 7. Given ˆˆz∗ < 1/2 and β ∈ (0, 1) there exists τ ∗∗∗ such that if
τ1 > τ
∗∗∗ a high quality and low quality equilibria coexist for all T . Customers
complaints become less informative as T increases.
In order to prove this Proposition, I first show the existence of a high quality
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(separating) and a low quality (pooling) equilibrium. The following Lemma will
be useful in proving the existence of those equilibria. It shows that, once con-
sumers know for sure the firm is good, they expect the firm to invest in every
period and the firm’s best reply is to invest.1
Lemma 9. Given zˆt = zˆH(1) and ˆˆz
∗ < 1/2, there exists a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in which It = 1 for all t.
Proof. Let τt = 1. The firm’s best reply in the one-shot game is It = H (see
sub-section 2.2.2). Furthermore, τt = 1 implies that τk = 1 for any k ≥ t. Then,
the game becomes a repetition of the one shot game in which consumers expect
to receive zˆH,k(1) in every period k ≥ t, and thus the firm optimally invests in
any period k ≥ t.
Consider the firm’s incentives to deviate to L in a period s ≥ t. Because
consumers’ already know the type of the firm, the deviation does not affect the
level of quality consumers’ expect to receive in any period after s, and thus it
does not affect the firm’s future profits. However, the deviation reduces the firm’s
current profits as it induces a lower quality realisation (on expectations). Then,
given τt=1, there is no profitable one-period deviation.
Claim 5. Investment in Equilibrium. Given ˆˆz∗ ≤ 1/2 and β ∈ (0, 1), there exists
τ ∗∗∗ such that there is an equilibrium in which the firm invests in every period t
in which τt is above τ
∗∗∗ and it does not invest otherwise.
Proof. Denote by s(τ) a firm’s investment strategy in which:
I =
 H if τ ≥ τL otherwise
1See Definition 2.
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The level of quality consumers expect to receive when the firm follows this strategy
is:
zˆ =
 zˆH(τ) if τ ≥ τzˆL otherwise
The value for the firm of following the strategy s(τ) depends only on τ . For
τ < τ , this value is:
Vs(τ)(τ) =
piL(ˆˆzL, σ
∗)
1− β (A.3)
while for τ ≥ τ this value is:
Vs(τ)(τ) = piH(ˆˆzH(τ), σ
∗) + β
[
piH(ˆˆzH(1), σ
∗)
2(1− β) +
1
2
Pr(τ ′ ≥ τ)Vs(τ)(τ ′) + (A.4)
+
1
2
Pr(τ ′ < τ)
piL(ˆˆzL, σ
∗)
(1− β)
]
where Pr(τ ′ > τ) = 1 if consumers’ beliefs about the type of the firm after a low
quality realisation is greater than τ : τ ′ = τ
2−τ ≥ τ .
There exists a unique function, V ∗s(τ)(τ), that solves (A.4). Consider the set
C([τ , 1]) of bounded, continuous and weakly decreasing functions of τ , and define
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an operator T on C([τ , 1]) as:
TVs(τ)(τ) = piH(ˆˆzH(τ), σ
∗) + β
[
piH(ˆˆzH(1), σ
∗)
2(1− β) +
1
2
Pr(τ ′ ≥ τ)Vs(τ)(τ ′) + (A.5)
+
1
2
Pr(τ ′ < τ)
piL(ˆˆzL, σ
∗)
(1− β)
]
Standard arguments can be used to show that a function V ∈ C([τ , 1]), solves
(A.4) if and only if it is a fixed point of T . The (expected) fine in any period t
is a weakly increasing function of consumers’ expected quality and so the firm’s
current profits are weakly decreasing in τ .2 Furthermore, the per period return
function is bounded and continuous in τ .3 Then, TVs(τ)(τ) is also bounded,
continuous and weakly decreasing in τ , and so T maps C([τ , 1]) into itself. It
is straightforward to show that Blackwell’s sufficient conditions of monotonicity
and discounting apply to the operator T . Hence, T is a contraction mapping
and so it has a unique fixed point, V ∗s(τ)(τ),
4 which is a bounded, continuous and
weakly decreasing function of τ .
If the firm deviates in the first period, but it attaches to the original strategy
thereafter, its expected payoff is:
V ds(τ)(τ) =
 piL(
ˆˆzH(τ), σ
∗) + β
[
Pr(τ ′ > τ)V ∗s(τ)(τ
′) + Pr(τ ′ ≤ τ)piL(ˆˆzL,σ∗)(1−β)
]
if τ ≥ τ
piH(ˆˆzL, σ
∗) + β2(1−β) [piL(ˆˆzL, σ
∗) + piH(ˆˆzH(1), σ∗)] otherwise
(A.6)
Denote by fs(τ)(τ) the difference between the firm’s expected payoffs when it
follows strategy s(τ) and when it deviates. When τ ≥ τ , fs(τ)(τ) is a bounded
and continuous function of τ because both V ∗s(τ)(τ) and Vd(τ) are bounded and
continuous. Furthermore, for all τ ≥ τ , fs(τ)(τ) is weakly increasing in τ and it
2For any I ∈ {L,H}, piI(ˆˆzH(τ), σ∗) is a weakly decreasing function of τ (strictly decreasing
for τ < 1), and piI(ˆˆzL, σ
∗) is constant in τ .
3Vs(τ)(τ
′) = piL(
ˆˆzL,σ
∗)
(1−β) if τ = τ . Then, Vs(τ)(τ) is continuous in τ
4By the Contraction Mapping Theorem.
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is given by:
fs(τ)(τ) = V
∗
s(τ)(τ)− V ds(τ)(τ) (A.7)
= −h+mp
(
zˆH(τ)− ψ
2
)
+ β
[
piH(ˆˆzH(1), σ
∗)
2(1− β) −
− 1
2
Pr
(
τ
2− τ > τ
)
V
s(τ)
∗ (τ)− 1
2
Pr
(
τ
2− τ ≤ τ
)
piL(ˆˆzL, σ
∗)
1− β
]
The first term of (A.7) is an increasing function of τ because zˆH(τ) is increas-
ing in τ . The second term is also weakly increasing in τ . When τ > τ
2−τ > τ ,
Pr
(
τ
2−τ > τ
)
= 1 and the second term is weakly increasing in τ because V ∗s(τ)(τ)
is weakly decreasing in τ . If τ is such that τ ≥ τ ≥ τ
2−τ , Pr
(
τ
2−τ ≤ τ
)
= 1 and
the second term of (A.7) becomes independent of τ . Recall that when τ ′ < τ ,
V
s(τ)
∗ (τ ′) =
Π(L,zˆL)
2(1−β) . Then, equation (A.7) can be written as:
fs(τ)(τ) = −h+mp
(
zˆH(τ)− ψ
2
)
+ β
[
piH(ˆˆzH(1), σ
∗)
2(1− β) −
1
2
V
s(τ)
∗ (τ ′)
]
The strategy s(τ) constitutes an equilibrium strategy if and only if fs(τ)(τ) ≥ 0
for every τ ∈ [0, 1]. Since fs(τ)(τ) is weakly increasing in τ for every τ ≥ τ , it
suffices to show that (1) fs(τ)(τ) ≥ 0 and (2) fs(τ)(τ) > 0 for every τ < τ .
Consider the first case:
fs(τ)(τ) = −h+mp
(
zˆH(τ)− ψ
2
)
− β
2(1− β) [piH(
ˆˆzH(1), σ
∗)− piL(ˆˆzL, σ∗)]
which is positive as long as zˆH(τ) ≥ ˆˆz∗
(
1 + β
2(1−β)
)
. Denote by τ ∗∗∗ the value of
τ for which fs(τ)(τ) = 0 -i.e., the τ for which zˆH(τ) = ˆˆz
∗(1 + β
2(1−β)
)
. Since zˆH(τ)
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is increasing in τ , zˆH(τ) ≥ ˆˆz∗
(
1 + β
2(1−β)
)
for all τ ≥ τ ∗∗∗.
Let τ ≥ τ ∗∗∗; given strategy s(τ), the firm does not have a profitable de-
viation. Suppose, to the contrary, that for some τ ≥ τ ∗∗∗, fs(τ)(τ) < 0; then
zˆH(τ) < ˆˆz
∗(1+ β
2(1−β)
)
, and so τ < τ ∗∗∗ which is a contradiction. Hence (1) holds.
Finally, consider (2). If τ < τ , fs(τ)(τ) is defined as the difference between
(A.3) and the second line of (A.6), and is equal to:
fs(τ)(τ) = h−mp
(
zˆL − ψ
2
)
+
β
2(1− β)
(
h+mp
ψ
2
)
which is positive as long as zˆL ≤ ˆˆz∗
(
1 + β
2(1−β)
)
.5 Furthermore, this condition is
independent of τ and so it implies that for every τ ∈ [0, τ), fs(τ)(τ) ≥ 0 and so
the firm is not willing to deviate from strategy s(τ).
Thus, given any τ ≥ τ ∗∗∗, there exists an equilibrium in which the firm follows
strategy s(τ), and the Claim is proved.
Claim 6. Pooling equilibrium Given τ ∈ [0, 1), there exists an equilibrium in
which I∗t = 0, for all t.
Proof. In a pooling equilibrium the good type of the firm does not invest and
consumers anticipate this behaviour; therefore, quality realisations below 1/2 are
not informative about the firm’s type. On equilibrium path, consumers’ beliefs
about the type of the firm are:
τt =
 τ0 if qk ≤ 1/2 for every k ≤ t− 11 if qk > 1/2 for some k ≤ t− 1
where τ0 is the probability consumers assign to the firm being good at the be-
ginning of the game. Denote by s(1) an strategy in which the firm invests only
5Recall that ˆˆz∗ = hmp +
ψ
2 .
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when τ = 1. The firm’s value from following this strategy is:
Vs(1)(τ) =
piL(ˆˆzL, σ
∗))
1− β =
p−mpEqL(σ∗(q; ˆˆzL))
1− β (A.8)
The firm’s incentives to deviate depend on the value of ˆˆz∗. Consider the case
in which ˆˆz∗ > 1/4. In this case, the firm has neither short run nor long run in-
centives to deviate form the non-investing strategy. If in any period t consumers
expect to receive low quality (zˆL) and the firm deviates, there exists a positive
probability that a high quality realisation reduces the (expected) proportion of
complaints and the expected fine. However, this reduction in the fine does not
compensate the cost of investment (h) and so period-t profits are reduced too,
implying that the firm has a short run incentive to fulfil consumers’ low quality
expectations.6 Long run considerations also prevent the firm from deviating. If
the firm invests in period t there exists a positive probability that consumers do
not find out the deviation (qt < 1/2); in this case the firm’s current profits are
smaller and future profits remain unchanged because τt+1 = τt = τ0. There is
also a positive probability that a high quality realisation reveals the firm’s type:
if qt > 1/2, τt+1 = 1 and zˆk = zˆH(1) ∀k > t. As shown in Lemma 9, the firm’s
best response is to invest in every period after k, which induces a continuation
value smaller than Vs(1)(τ).
7 Therefore, when ˆˆz > 1/4 and τ < 1 there exists
a pooling equilibrium in which the firm never invests and consumers expect low
quality.
When ˆˆz < 1/4, the firm has short run incentives to invest. In this case,
6Recall from Section 2.3 that when ˆˆz∗ > 1/4, low quality is an equilibrium of the stage
game -i.e., the stage game has an equilibrium in which I = 0 and consumers’ expect low quality
(zˆL).
7The firm’s expected profits in a low quality equilibrium of the stage game are piL(ˆˆzL, σ
∗) =
p −mp(2zˆL − ψ), while its profits in a high quality equilibrium if τ = 1 are piH(ˆˆzH(τ), σ∗) =
p− h−mp(zˆH(1)− ψ2 ). There exists no value of ˆˆz∗ > 0 for which the latter profits are higher
than the former ones. As there is no updating of beliefs, the expected profits of the repeated
game are piL(
ˆˆzL,σ
∗)
1−β >
piH(ˆˆzH(τ),σ
∗)
1−β .
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the punishment is harsh relative to the cost of investment and so current profits
increase if the firm deviates. The same as before, if the firm deviates in period t
there is a positive probability that consumers find out its type (and hence expect
high quality from t + 1 onwards) and a positive probability that they do not
detect the firm’s deviation. The value for the firm if it deviates from s(1) in the
current period, but follows it since tomorrow onwards is:
V ds(1)(τ) = piH(
ˆˆzL, σ
∗) +
β
2
[
piL(ˆˆzL, σ
∗)
1− β +
piH(ˆˆzH(1), σ
∗)
1− β
]
(A.9)
The firm will attach to the non-investment strategy as long as the continuation
value in (A.8) is greater than the one above. A necessary and sufficient condition
is:
zˆL ≤ ˆˆz∗
[
1 +
β
2(1− β)
]
(A.10)
Claim 7. Given ˆˆz∗ < 1/2 and β ∈ (0, 1), there exist τ ∈ (τ ∗, τ ∗∗∗) such that the
game has a HQE and a LQE when T = 1 but there exists a unique LQE when
T →∞. As a result, complaints are less informative when T →∞.
Proof. From Proposition 1, there exist τ ∗ = 4ˆˆz∗ − 1 such that for every τ ≥ τ ∗
the one shot game has a high quality equilibrium. Analogously, from Claim 5,
there exist τ ∗∗∗ = 4ˆˆz∗(1 + β
2(1−β)) − 1 such that for τ > τ ∗∗∗ and T → ∞ there
exists an equilibrium in which the firm invests in every period. As β
2(1−β) > 0,
τ ∗∗∗ ≥ τ ∗, and so for τ ∈ (τ ∗, τ ∗∗∗) the firm invests in equilibrium when T = 1
but it does not when T →∞.
The same as when the game is repeated an infinite number of times, the set
of τ ∈ (τ ∗, τ ∗∗∗) corresponds to values of the parameters for which complaints
are informative in the one shot game. When T = 1, complaints are informative
if 1 − 2ψ ≥ τ ≥ 4ˆˆz∗ − 1, which implies 1 − 2ψ ≥ τ ≥ τ ∗. In each period of the
99
infinitely repeated game this condition becomes 1 − 2ψ ≥ τt ≥ τ ∗∗∗. The set of
values of τ for which the second condition holds is smaller because τ ∗∗∗ ≥ τ ∗.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs
Claim 1
For any rule R, good reviews increase the probability consumers assign to the
value of the good being high: λ′G(λ,R) ≥ λ ⇐⇒
∫ qK
q¯
fH(q)dq ≥
∫ qK
q¯
fL(q)dq.
This is true because increasing likelihood ratio implies first order stochastic dom-
inance.1
Analogously, λ′B(λ;R) ≤ λ ⇐⇒
∫ q
0
fH(q)dq ≤
∫ q
0
fL(q)dq, which is also
implied by first order stochastic dominance.
Finally, observing that the previous consumer bought the good but he did
not complete a review is bad news about v if λ′N(λ;R) ≤ λ, or
∫ q¯
q
fH(q)dq ≤∫ q¯
q
fL(q)dq. Whether this inequality holds or not depends on the quality realisa-
tion at which fH(q) = fL(q).
2 To see this, denote by qˆ the crossing point of the
distributions and consider two extreme cases:
1First order stochastic dominance implies FH(q) ≤ FL(q) for every q ∈ [q0, qK ].
2As FH(q) dominates FL(q) in terms of the likelihood ratio, fH(q) and fL(q) cross only
once.
101
• If qˆ ≤ q, then fH(q) ≥ fL(q). Increasing MLRP implies that the ratio
fH(q)/fL(q) is increasing in q, then fH(q) ≥ fL(q) implies fH(q) ≥ fL(q)
for every q ∈ (q, q¯) and so ∫ q¯
q
fH(q)dq ≥
∫ q¯
q
fL(q)dq and λ
′
N(λ;R) ≥ λ.
• On the other extreme, consider the case in which qˆ ≥ q¯. In this case,
fH(q¯) ≤ fL(q¯) and by increasing MLRP, this implies fH(q) ≤ fL(q) for
every q ∈ (q, q¯). As a result, λ′N(λ;R) ≤ λ.
As a result, no reviews are bad news when the crossing of the quality distributions
is very high relative to the upper bound of the social norm, but they become more
and more good news the closer is the crossing point to the lower bound of the
social norm.
Claim 2
λ′G(λ;R) ≥ λ′N(λ;R) for every social norm if and only if
∫ q¯
q fL(q)dq∫ q¯
q fH(q)dq
≥
∫ qK
q¯ fL(q)dq∫ qK
q¯ fH(q)dq
for every R. This expression can be written as:
1− FH(q¯)
FH(q¯)− FH(q) ≥
1− FL(q¯)
FL(q¯)− FL(q) (B.1)
The inequality holds because first order stochastic dominance implies that the
numerator of the left hand side is greater than that of the right hand side, while
FH(q¯)− FH(q) ≤ FL(q¯)− FL(q).
A similar argument can be used to show that λ′N(λ;R) ≥ λ′B(λ;R). When
the previous consumer bough the good, observing no reviews results in a higher
posterior than observing a bad review if and only if:
FH(q¯)− FH(q)
FH(q)
≥ FL(q¯)− FL(q)
FL(q)
(B.2)
for every rule {q¯, q}. To see that this inequality holds, note that both numerators
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are increasing functions of q¯, but the left hand side increases at a rate fH(q¯)
while the right hand side increases at a lower rate fL(q¯).
3 When q¯ → q, condition
(B.2) becomes
FL(q)
fL(q)
≥ FH(q)
fH(q)
, which holds because increasing monotone likelihood
property implies reverse hazard rate dominance.4 As q¯ increases, the denominator
of the left hand side of (B.2) increases faster than that of the right hand side and
so, given any q > q0, condition (B.2) holds for any q¯ ∈ (q, qK ].
Claim 3
∂λ′G(λ; q, q¯)
∂q¯
=
λ(1− λ)[fL(q¯)
∫ qK
q¯ fH(q)dq − fH(q¯)
∫ qK
q¯ fL(q)dq]
[λ
∫ qK
q¯ fH(q)dq + (1− λ
∫ qK
q¯ fL(q)dq]
2
≥ 0 (B.3)
The denominator is the probability of observing a good review squared, so it is
positive. The sing of the numerator depends on the sign of [fL(q¯
∫ K
q¯
fH(q)dq −
fH(q¯
∫ K
q¯
fL(q)dq], which is positive as long as the distribution of quality condi-
tional on H dominates in hazard rate sense the one conditional on L.5 As hazard
rate dominance is implied by increasing monotone likelihood ratio, the numerator
is positive and the result in the Claim holds.
Consumers’ beliefs after observing a bad review are increasing in q:
∂λ′B(λ; q, q¯)
∂q
=
λ(1− λ)[fH(q)
∫ q
q0
fL(q)dq − fL(q)
∫ q
q0
fH(q)dq]
[λ
∫ q
q0
fH(q)dq + (1− λ)
∫ q
q0
fL(q)dq]2
≥ 0 (B.4)
The denominator is the probability of observing a bad review squared, so it is pos-
itive. The numerator is positive as long as fH(q)
∫ q
q0
fL(q)dq ≥ fL(q)
∫ q
q0
fH(q)dq,
3Increasing monotone likelihood implies that fH(q)/fL(q) is an increasing function of q.
4Using L’Hopital’s rule:
lim
q¯→q
FL(q¯)− FL(q)
FH(q¯)− FH(q) =
fL(q)
fH(q)
5Hazard rate dominance implies fL(q¯)[1− FH(q¯)] ≥ fH(q¯)[1− FL(q¯)]. See ?.
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which holds by inverse hazard rate dominance.6
A similar analysis shows that the updating after observing no reviews (when
the previous consumer bought the good) is also an increasing function of the
thresholds of the social rule:
∂λ′N (λ; q, q¯)
∂q¯
=
λ(1− λ)[fH(q¯)
∫ q¯
q fL(q)dq − fL(q¯)
∫ q¯
q fH(q)dq]
[λ
∫ q¯
q fH(q)dq + (1− λ)
∫ q¯
q fL(q)dq]
2
≥ 0 (B.5)
∂λ′N (λ; q, q¯)
∂q
=
λ(1− λ)[fL(q)
∫ q¯
q fH(q)dq − fH(q)
∫ q¯
q fL(q)dq]
[λ
∫ q¯
q fH(q)dq + (1− λ)
∫ q¯
q fL(q)dq]
2
≥ 0 (B.6)
Proposition 3
Convexity of the profit function
If the firm offers the optimal static price, pˆ(λ′i), its expected profits are pi(λ
′
i) =
(λ′i+L−c)2
4(λ′i+L)
. Taking derivatives with respect to λ′i:
∂pi(λ′i)
∂λ′i
=
(λ′i + L− c)(λ′i + L+ c)
4(λ′i + L)2
> 0 for every L > c
∂2pi(λ′i;R)
∂λ′i
2 =
c2
4(λ′i + L)3
> 0 for every c > 0
Convexity of the utility function
The expected utility in any period t, given the consumer’s prior λ′i and a price
p is:
u(λ′i;R) = P (γ >
p
λ′i + L
)
[
E(γ|γ > p
λ′i + L
)(λ′i + L)− p
]
=
[
λ′i + L− p
λ′i + L
] [
λ′i + L+ p
2
− p
]
=
(λ′i + L− p)2
2(λ′i + L)
6Reverse hazard rate dominance implies fL(q)FH(q) ≤ fH(q)FL(q). See ?
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where I used the conditional expectation of γ:
E
(
γ|γ ≥ p
λ+ L
)
=
1
1− pλ+L
[∫ 1
p
λ+L
xdx
]
=
λ+ L+ p
2(λ+ L)
Taking partial derivatives with respect to λ′i:
∂u(λ′i;R)
∂λi
=
(λ′i + L+ p)(λ
′
i + L− p)
2(λ′i + L)2
∂2u(λ′i;R)
∂λ′i
2 =
p2
(λ′i + L)3
The second expression is positive for every p > 0, while the first one is positive
as long as p < L+ c. Then , consumers’ utility function is increasing and convex
with respect to λ′i for every positive price at which some consumer is willing to buy.
In particular, it is increasing and convex in the prior when p = pˆ(λ′i) =
λ′i+L+c
2
.
The expected utility of a consumer who observed review i, when the second period
price is pˆ(λ′i) is:
7
u(λ′i;R) =
[λ′i + L− c]2
8(λ′i + L)
Taking derivatives with respect to λ′i:
∂u(λ′i;R)
∂λi
=
(λ′i + L− c)(λ′i + L+ c)
8(λ′i + L)2
> 0 for every i ∈ {G,N,B} and L > c
∂2u(λ′i;R)
∂λ′i
2 =
c2
4(λ′i + L)3
> 0 for every i ∈ {G,N,B} and c > 0
Then, whichever the review completed by the previous consumer and the price
7Given p = pˆ(λ′i), the probability that the consumer buys the good is:
P (γ ≥ pˆ
λ′i + L
) =
λ′i + L− p∗
λ′i + L
=
λ′i + L− c
2(λ′i + L)
and the expected value of γ conditional on the consumer buying is:
E(γ|γ ≥ pˆ
λ′i + L
) =
1
1− pˆλ′i+L
[
∫ 1
pˆ
λ′
i
+L
xdx] =
3λ′i + 3L+ c
4(λ′i + L)
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set by the monopolist, the expected utility of the second consumer is increasing
and convex in λ′i.
Claim 4
The martingale property of the beliefs also holds when the previous consumer
bought the good with some probability in (0, 1):
E(λt+1|λ, q, q¯) = P
(
γ ≥ p
λ+ L
) ∑
i∈{G,N,B}
P (i)λit+1 + P
(
γ <
p
λ+ L
)
λ
= P
(
γ ≥ p
λ+ L
)
λ
[∫ qK
q¯
fH(q)dq +
∫ q¯
q
fH(q)dq +
∫ q
q0
fH(q)dq
]
+ P
(
γ <
p
λ+ L
)
λ
= P
(
γ ≥ p
λ+ L
)
λ+ P
(
γ <
p
λ+ L
)
λ
= λ
Lemma 6
Assume that the first period consumer bought the good and that completing
reviews is not costly. Consider two alternative social rules: one that uses two
messages and another one that uses three messages. Each rule determines a dis-
tribution of posterior beliefs with mean λ (because of the martingale property
of beliefs). Given that consumers’ payoff is convex in λ′, they prefers the rule
with three messages over the one with two messages if and only if the second
distribution of posterior beliefs is a mean preserving spread of the first one.8
Consider first a norm such that consumers complete a bad review if q1 ≤ qˆ and
a good review otherwise. Denote by λ− the beliefs of second period consumers
after observing a bad review and by λ+ their beliefs after observing a good review.
Denoting by F (·) the cumulative distribution of λ′ induced by this norm, then:
F (λ−) = P (λ′ ≤ λ−) = P (q ≤ qˆ), F (λ+) = P (λ′ ≤ λ+) = 1. The expected value
8Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
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of λ′ under this rule is:
E(λ′|λ, qˆ) = P (λ−)λ− + P (λ+)λ+ (B.7)
= [λ
∫ qˆ
q0
fH(q)dq + (1− λ)
∫ qˆ
q0
fL(q)dq]
λ
∫ qˆ
q0
fH(q)dq
λ
∫ qˆ
q0
fH(q)dq + (1− λ)
∫ qˆ
q0
fL(q)dq
+
+ [λ
∫ qK
qˆ
fH(q)dq + (1− λ)
∫ qK
qˆ
fL(q)dq]
λ
∫ qK
qˆ fH(q)dq
λ
∫ qK
qˆ fH(q)dq + (1− λ)
∫ qK
qˆ fL(q)dq
= λ[
∫ qˆ
q0
fH(q)dq +
∫ qK
qˆ
fH(q)dq] = λ
Consider an alternative rule in which first period consumers can send three
different messages, G, N and B. They complete a bad review if the quality re-
alisation was below a threshold q, complete no reviews if q1 ∈ (q, q¯) and they
complete a good review if q1 ≥ q¯. Denote by λB, λN and λG consumers beliefs
after observing a bad review, no review or a good review, respectively. Denote
by H(·) the distribution of second period beliefs induced by this rule. Then,
H(λB) = P (λ′ ≤ λB) = P (q1 ≤ q), H(λN) = P (λ2 ≤ λN) = P (q1 ≤ q¯) and
H(λG) = P (λ′ ≤ λG) = 1. As shown in Claim 4, E(λ′|λ, q, q¯) = λ.
As both distributions of beliefs have the same mean and consumers’ payoff
function is convex in the beliefs, they will prefer the distribution induced by
the second rule over the one induced by the first rule if the second one is a mean
preserving spread of the first one or, equivalently, if F (·) dominates stochastically
of second order H(·). A sufficient condition for this to be true is:
∫ λ′
0
H(t)dt ≥
∫ λ′
0
F (t)dt for every λ′ ∈ [0, 1] (B.8)
Consider the case in which qˆ = q¯.9 In this case, λN > λ− > λB (see below)
and λ+ = λG. To show second order stochastic dominance it is necessary to show
9A similar analysis can be done by assuming any other value of qˆ ∈ [q0, qK ] and the con-
clusions would not change.
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that condition (B.8) holds for every possible value of λ′. To start with, note
that for λ′ < λ− the distribution of beliefs under H(·) accumulates more mass
than under F (·) because F (λ′ < λ−) = 0 while H(λ′ < λ−) = H(λB) > 0. The
probability of observing a value of λ′ ∈ (λ−, λN), on the other hand, is greater
under F (·). However, as P (λB)[λ− − λB] = [P (λ−) − P (λB)](λN − λ−), where
P (λ−) − P (λB) = P (λN),10 both distributions accumulate the same mass for
every λ′ > λN . Then:
• For λ′ < λ−: ∫ λ′
0
H(t)dt >
∫ λ′
0
F (t)dt,
• For λ′ < λN , ∫ λ′
0
H(t)dt >
∫ λ′
0
F (t)dt.
• For λ′ ≥ λN : ∫ λ′
0
H(t)dt =
∫ λ′
0
F (t)dt.
Then, the distribution of beliefs induced by the two-messages rule second order
stochastically dominates the one induced by the three-messages rule. Together
with the fact that both distributions have the same mean, this implies that H(·)
is a mean preserving spread of F (·) and so consumers expected payoff is greater
under the last rule. A similar result can be obtained for qˆ = q or for any other
qˆ ∈ (0, 1).
The results above assume that λN ≤ λ− ≤ λB. Now I show that those as-
sumptions are correct.
λ− ≤ λB ⇐⇒
∫ q
q0
fL(q)dq∫ q
q0
fH(q)dq
≥
∫ qˆ
q0
fL(q)dq∫ qˆ
q0
fH(q)dq
, which can be written as FH(qˆ)
FH(q)
≥ FL(qˆ)
FL(q)
.
As we are assuming qˆ = q¯, this is the same as FH(q¯)
FH(q)
≥ FL(q¯)
FL(q)
which implies
λG(q¯, q) ≥ λB(q¯, q).
λ− ≥ λN ⇐⇒ FL(q¯)−FL(q)
FH(q¯)−FH(q) ≥
FL(qˆ)
FH(qˆ)
. Using the fact that qˆ = q¯, the pre-
vious condition becomes
FL(q¯)−FL(q)
FH(q¯)−FH(q) ≥
FL(q¯)
FH(q¯)
, which holds because it implies
10Given qˆ = q¯, P (λ−) = P (λG), and P (λG)− P (λB) = P (λN ) by construction.
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λG(q¯, q) ≥ λN(q¯, q).
Lemma 8
The result in Lemma 8 is an immediate implication of the results in the next
two claims:
Claim 8. For every λ ∈ (0, 1), q¯ ∈ (q0, qK ] there exists h(λ, q¯) such that ∂V (R,λ)
∂q
|q=q0−
h∂P (B;R,λ)
∂q
|q=q0 > 0 for all 0 < h ≤ h(λ, q¯))
Claim 9. For every λ ∈ (0, 1), q ∈ [q0, qK) there exists h¯(λ, q) such that ∂V (R,λ)
∂q¯
|q¯=qK−
h∂P (G;R,λ)
∂q¯
|q¯=qK < 0 for all 0 < h ≤ h¯(λ, q)).
To see that the result in Claim 8 holds, consider what happens when q → q0.
From Lemma 6, ∂V (R,λ)
∂q
|q=q0 > 0 for every λ ∈ (0, 1) because when the cost
of completing reviews is not taken into account, consumers’ expected utility is
greater when the reviewing rule uses the three available messages. On the other
hand, ∂P (B;R,λ)
∂q
|q=q0 = λfH(q0) + (1 − λ)fL(q0). If the distribution of quality
realisations is such that fH(q
0) = fL(q
0) = 0, then ∂P (B;R,λ)
∂q
|q=q0 = 0 and the
result in the Claim holds. If the distribution of quality realisations has fat tails
and fH(q
0) > 0 and fL(q
0) > 0, then the result in the Claim holds as long as
there exists h > 0 such that
h(λ, q¯) ≤
∂V (R,λ)
∂q
|q=q0
∂P (B;R,λ)
∂q
|q=q0
=
∂V (R,λ)
∂q
|q=q0
λfH(q0) + (1− λ)fL(q0) (B.9)
which holds because both, the numerator and the denominator are positive for
every λ ∈ (0, 1) and for every q¯ ∈ (q0, qK ].
An analogous argument can be used to prove Claim 9. In this case the con-
dition for consumers to prefer q¯ < qK is that ∂V (R,λ)
∂q¯
|q¯=qK − h∂P (G;R,λ)∂q¯ |q¯=qK < 0.
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From Lemma 6, as q¯ moves away from qK , consumers’ expected utility V (·) in-
creases; as a result, ∂V (R,λ)
∂q¯
|q¯=qK < 0. Furthermore, ∂P (G;R,λ)∂q¯ |q¯=qK = −[λfH(qK)+
(1 − λ)fL(qK)] ≤ 0, with strict inequality if the distribution of quality realisa-
tions has “fat tails”. If fH(q
K) = fL(q
K) = 0, the condition in the claim holds
for every λ ∈ (0, 1) and for every h > 0. Otherwise, if the distribution of quality
realisations assigns positive probability to the tails, the condition in the claim
becomes:
h¯(λ, q) ≤ −
∂V (R,λ)
∂q¯
|q¯=qK
∂P (G;R,λ)
∂q¯
|q¯=qK
= −
∂V (R,λ)
∂q¯
|q¯=qK
λfH(qK) + (1− λ)fL(qK) (B.10)
which is positive because, as mentioned above, the numerator is negative and the
denominator is positive.
B.2 Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property
For any θ0, θ1 ∈ Θ such that θ1 ≥ θ0, MLRP implies 1−F (q¯|θ1)F (q¯|θ1) ≥
1−F (q¯|θ0)
F (q¯|θ0) . The
claim below shows why this is the case.
Claim 10. f(·|θ) satisfies MLRP, then for any θ0, θ1 ∈ Θ such that θ1 ≥ θ0 we
have 1−F (q¯|θ1)
F (q¯|θ1) ≥
1−F (q¯|θ0)
F (q¯|θ0) and
1−F (q|θ1)
F (q|θ1) ≥
F (q|θ0)
F (q|θ1) .
Proof. The family of densities f(·|θ) satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio prop-
erty if for all q1 ≥ q0 and θ1 ≥ θ0 we have:
f(q1|θ1)f(q0|θ0) ≥ f(q0|θ1)f(q1|θ0) (B.11)
Integrating both sides of this expression over q0 from 0 (lower bound of q) to
q1: ∫ q1
0
f(q1|θ1)f(q0|θ0)dq0 ≥
∫ q1
0
f(q0|θ1)f(q1|θ0)dq0
f(q1|θ1)F (q1|θ0) ≥ F (q1|θ1)f(q1|θ0)
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Let a = q1, we have:
f(a|θ1)
f(a|θ0) ≥
F (a|θ1)
F (a|θ0) (B.12)
Integrating both sides of (B.11) with respect to q1, from q0 to 1 (upper bound
of q):
∫ 1
q0
f(q1|θ1)f(q0|θ0)dq1 ≥
∫ 1
q0
f(q0|θ1)f(q1|θ0)dq1
Let a = q0, we have:
1− F (a|θ1)
1− F (a|θ0) ≥
f(a|θ1)
f(a|θ0) (B.13)
Combining (B.12) and (B.13), we have:
1− F (a|θ1)
1− F (a|θ0) ≥
F (a|θ1)
F (a|θ0)
This result holds for any a ∈ [0, 1]. In particular: 1−F (q¯|θ1)
1−F (q¯|θ0) ≥
F (q¯|θ1)
F (q¯|θ0) and
1−F (q|θ1)
1−F (q|θ0) ≥
F (q|θ1)
F (q|θ0) .
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